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Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the UN Representative on IDPs 
Preface
The recommendations issued by the UN Secretary-General’s Representative on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons following his country visits provide useful guidance for governments and 
other relevant actors with regard to improving their responses to situations of internal displacement. The 
recommendations, which form part of his mission reports submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, 
address outstanding issues and outline ways to strengthen the protection of the human rights of IDPs in 
line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 
In order to support the process of implementing the recommendations, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre initiated a series of reports on progress made with regard to 
putting the recommendations into practice. Each report has been prepared in partnership with, and based on 
field research by, prominent national civil society organisations dealing with issues of internal displacement 
in their respective countries. This not only ensures that the wealth of information gathered by national 
non-governmental actors is reflected in the reports. It also strengthens the involvement of civil society in 
the process of implementation of the recommendations. In the case of Turkey, the implementation report 
was prepared in conjunction with the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).                 
By publishing this series of reports, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre aims to raise awareness of 
the Representative’s recommendations, take stock of progress made with regard to their implementation, 
and point to gaps where more action is needed. It is our hope that the reports will serve as a useful tool for 
governments, as well as for international organisations and national civil society groups, to follow up on 
the Representative’s recommendations and develop effective responses to internal displacement that are 
fully in accordance with the Guiding Principles.    
Elisabeth K. Rasmusson
NRC Resident Representative in Geneva
Head of Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
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Foreword
As Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, I welcome this series of reports issued by the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre following up on missions that my predecessor and I have undertaken to countries 
facing serious issues of internal displacement. As this initiative recognizes, my official reports to the United 
Nations, along with recommendations made to Governments, parties to conflict, international actors and 
civil society, are not intended to conclude analysis and examination of a country; much more, the reports 
and their accompanying recommendations should be viewed as starting a process of reflection leading to 
concrete improvements in the lives of the internally displaced. 
As such, I am very pleased that the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, along with other civil society 
actors, has built upon a series of mission reports of former Representative Deng and myself with current 
field research assessing the progress made in the intervening months and years. My hope is that reviews 
such as this will encourage all relevant actors to take a careful inventory of the progress made and, 
where necessary, recalibrate and refocus future efforts. These reports will also be a useful reference for 
my continuing engagement with individual situations and dialogue with Governments and civil society. 
I therefore encourage the Norwegian Refugee Council and other partners in civil society to continue this 
valuable and positive work.
Prof. Walter Kälin
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons
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5Authors’ Foreword
There was inevitably a time lag between the drafting of this report and its publication. Most of the 
information was updated in early spring 2006, at a time when the Turkish government had confirmed its 
intention to address the internal displacement problem in line with the Guiding Principles, and international 
cooperation towards this end was taking off the ground. However, soon afterwards, armed assaults by 
the PKK and military operations by the Turkish security forces as well as urban protests pertaining to the 
Kurdish conflict erupted in the eastern and south-eastern provinces of Turkey where original displacement 
had taken place and where returns have started in the past few years.
The authors of this report are concerned that, if this situation persists in the months to come, it could 
endanger sustainable returns in the region and even trigger new displacement. This assessment does not 
contradict the report’s findings, some of which provide an optimistic view of the government’s declared 
intention to tackle the problem and the evolving international cooperation. To the contrary, the present 
situation makes one of the report’s key conclusions all the more pertinent: a durable and sustainable 
solution to the internal displacement problem in Turkey cannot be achieved without a peaceful end to the 
Kurdish conflict and a process of reconciliation, which would require – among other things – addressing 
issues of justice, and the disarmament and social rehabilitation of PKK members and government-employed 
village guards alike. 
Dilek Kurban    |   Ayşe Betül Çelik   |   Deniz Yükseker
Members, TESEV Working and Monitoring Group on Internal Displacement in Turkey
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Executive Summary
Background to the Report
At the invitation of the government of Turkey, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally 
Displaced Persons (RSG), Francis Deng, undertook a mission to Turkey from 27 to 31 May 2002 “to gain 
first-hand knowledge of the situation of internal displacement in the country and to hold a dialogue 
with the government, international agencies, representatives of donor countries and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) with a view to ensuring that the conditions of the internally displaced in Turkey are 
responded to effectively”.1 As a result of his visit, the RSG presented findings and recommendations to the 
Commission on Human Rights (hereafter CHR) in November 2002.  
The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) has prepared this report in an effort to 
comprehensively assess the implementation of the RSG’s recommendations, as well as to present findings 
which reflect a balanced picture of the state of affairs in Turkey.  It draws on TESEV’s report written by the 
Working and Monitoring Group on Internal Displacement in Turkey (hereafter “TESEV Working Group”),2 
the fieldwork conducted in 2005 in several provinces by several members of this research group3 and the 
follow-up research done in February and March 2006.4 In addition, this report also draws upon assessments 
conducted by human rights groups, civil society organisations and other sources.5  
Acknowledgements
This report is based on field research conducted in Istanbul and in Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkâri provinces 
of south-eastern Turkey in 2005 with follow-up research conducted in February and March 2006. It was 
written by Dilek Kurban (TESEV), Ayşe Betül Çelik (Sabancı University) and Deniz Yükseker (Koç University) 
and builds on an earlier report issued by TESEV in October 2005 titled “The Problem of Internal Displacement 
in Turkey: Assessment and Policy Proposals”, which was authored by A. Tamer Aker (Kocaeli University), 
Ayşe Betül Çelik, Dilek Kurban, Turgay Ünalan (Hacettepe University) and Deniz Yükseker. This report was 
commissioned and sponsored by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC). The IDMC, in particular Dina Abou Samra, Country Analyst, also provided valuable 
research comments.  
Summary of Main Findings and Recommendations
More than a decade has passed since internal displacement took place in eastern and south-eastern Turkey 
in the course of the conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). 
Yet it was not until the RSG’s mission to Turkey in 2002 that the government officially acknowledged the 
existence of the problem. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) had virtually no access to government aid until 
about 1999, and aid for the displaced since then has also been meagre. The RSG’s visit was a turning point 
in that it drew the attention of the public to the plight of the IDPs. 
1 “Specific Groups and Individuals Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons”, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
internally displaced persons, Francis Deng, visit to Turkey, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/56, 
E/CN.4/2003/86/Add.2, 27 November 2002, Executive Summary, page 2, para.1.
2 A. T. Aker, A. B. Çelik, D. Kurban, T. Ünalan and H. D. Yükseker, “The Problem of Internal Displacement in Turkey: Assessment 
and Policy Proposals”, Istanbul, 28 October 2005, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal 
Etüdler Vakfı-TESEV), available from http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/events/TESEV_IDP%20ReportEditedTranslation-Final22Dec05.doc 
(hereafter, “TESEV Report”).  
3 A. Tamer Aker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Dilek Kurban and Deniz Yükseker conducted week-long field studies in Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri 
and Istanbul in 2005 during which they interviewed internally displaced people, public authorities, municipality officials, civil society 
representatives, lawyers, healthcare officials and social service workers. 
4 Ayşe Betül Çelik, Dilek Kurban and Deniz Yükseker conducted follow-up research through in-person, phone and written 
communications in Istanbul and Ankara.
5 The authors are grateful to various institutions, organisations and persons for providing them with information and documents that 
were used in the preparation of this report. In particular, they would like to thank the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the European Commission in Ankara; Diyarbakır, Batman 
and Hakkâri Governorships; Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkâri Municipalities; Batman Çağdaş Newspaper; Migrants’ Association for 
Social Solidarity and Culture (Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği-Göç-Der); Human Rights Association (HRA); The 
Association for Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed (Insan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği-Mazlum-
Der); Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey; Diyarbakır and Batman Bar Associations; and lawyers in Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkâri. 
The authors would also like to acknowledge careful research assistance by Derya Demirler, Harun Ercan, Mert Kayhan and Şefika 
Kumral. They are also grateful to the many displaced persons who shared their stories with them.  
Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the UN Representative on IDPs 
Since the publication of the RSG’s report in 2002, the Turkish government has taken some concrete steps to 
address the IDP issue, most notable of which are the enactment of the “Law on Compensation for Losses 
Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism” (hereafter “Compensation Law”) in July 2004, 
the initiation of the Hacettepe University survey titled “Study on Migration and the Displaced Population in 
Turkey” (hereafter “Hacettepe Survey”) in December 2004, and the formulation of a framework document 
for government policy titled “Measures on the Issue of IDPs and the Return to Village and Rehabilitation 
Project in Turkey” (hereafter the “Framework Document”) in August 2005. The United Nations (UN) has 
actively provided consultation and guidance to the government during this period, culminating in the 
recent signing of an agreement between the government and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) titled “Support to the Development of an IDP Programme in Turkey”. 
While these are positive developments, research findings that will be elaborated in this report show 
that serious problems exist regarding the substance and implementation of the Compensation Law, the 
dissemination of the results of the Hacettepe Survey, and the scope and implementation of the Framework 
Document. Overall, these policies have been designed by public officials under Turkey’s obligations based 
on its National Programme for Adoption of the European Union (EU) Acquis Communautaire and in 
consultation with the UN, but without sufficient participation by civil society. Like other aspects of the 
reforms undertaken within the framework of Turkey’s EU accession process, the top-down planning of 
policies on internal displacement suffers from a democratic deficit. In addition to this, the government has 
not yet developed concrete programmes to ensure sustainable returns to places where original displacement 
took place and to reintegrate urban IDPs who do not wish to return. 
In addition to these problem areas, the lingering on of the armed conflict in the eastern and south-
eastern regions of the country albeit at a low level is a significant cause of concern. Continuing hostilities 
in the region pose a threat for returnees and discourage others contemplating return. The restoration 
of “peace” and the disarmament and reintegration of militants are among demands frequently raised 
by IDPs and NGOs. 
The armed conflict in the region has left a legacy of mistrust towards the state, which leads IDPs and civil 
society organisations to doubt the sincerity and longevity of the positive steps taken by the government. 
Furthermore, there is a demand from IDPs, civil society and the public for the government to address 
the massive human rights violations which occurred during this period, including the eviction of villagers 
from their homes. For this reason it is a matter of concern that there is no mention of issues such as 
rebuilding trust, restoring justice and achieving reconciliation in the government’s existing IDP policy and 
in the evolving cooperation between the UN and the government. In that respect, the solution to the 
displacement problem in Turkey also continues to be dependent on a peaceful and comprehensive solution 
to the Kurdish issue. 
In light of the above observations, this report makes the following recommendations, thematically 
organised on the basis of the RSG’s report, with the addition of a new recommendation under the heading 
of “reconciliation.”
Clarifying and Disseminating the National Policy 
The government’s acknowledgment of the internal displacement problem, its expression of political will to 
address the issue in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“Guiding Principles”) 
and its commitment to develop a strategy based on the Framework Document constitute significant progress. 
However, they are also belated steps, which follow a period of inaction of more than ten years. The lack 
of transparency and NGO participation are also grounds for concern. In order to facilitate the meaningful 
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participation of civil society and to raise awareness among the affected IDP communities about government 
policy, the Framework Document should be immediately and widely distributed. The government should 
systematically consult NGOs on putting together and implementing a strategy based on the Framework 
Document. As regards establishing a structure for the implementation of its policy, the government should 
create a focal point of responsibility within the interior ministry, which would coordinate cooperation 
with government institutions, civil society organisations and the international community, and set aside a 
transparent and accountable budget with sufficient funds.
Data Collection 
The commissioning of Hacettepe University to conduct a comprehensive study on IDPs is a very significant 
step towards understanding the causes of internal displacement, and identifying the current conditions and 
needs of the displaced. The initiation of the survey has raised expectations that the findings would facilitate 
the development of government policy, international cooperation and possible future NGO projects. 
However, Hacettepe University has not yet shared the findings of the study, the quantitative component of 
which was completed in November 2005. The findings of both the qualitative and quantitative components 
of the Hacettepe Survey should be disclosed completely and without further delay. The authorities and the 
Hacettepe University should take steps to ensure that the academic freedom of scholars studying internal 
displacement is respected.
Protection
The “village guard” system poses a risk in terms of the protection of human rights and an obstacle to IDP 
returns in the region. Both provisional and voluntary village guards should be disarmed and the system 
should be disbanded. As part of their rehabilitation, village guards should be provided with social security 
coverage and employment opportunities in peaceful sectors. In order to facilitate peace and security, 
PKK militants need to be reintegrated into society through complete disarmament. The government and 
NGOs should cooperate in developing policies about the social reintegration of all parties to the conflict. 
The landmines issue is of great concern due to the lack of comprehensive statistics on their locations and 
numbers. Landmines and unexploded ordinance also pose a significant threat to returning IDPs. The 
government and the armed forces should cooperate with local NGOs and international institutions to 
effectively and expeditiously tackle this problem. As a first step, the government needs to ensure that all 
mined and potentially mined areas are fenced off and marked with clear signs. The government should also 
launch a centrally-coordinated mine risk education programme in Turkish and Kurdish, in cooperation with 
civil society, local administrations and international institutions.  
Current Conditions of the Displaced
The majority of the IDP population in Turkey has been living in urban centres for nearly ten years. Since 
there are no programmes specifically addressing the current conditions of the displaced, they have had to 
face enormous problems such as endemic unemployment, abuse of child labour, lack of access to education 
and health care services, and almost no psychosocial care for women and children. The government, 
UNDP and civil society organisations urgently need to cooperate in order to develop projects that would 
specifically target the problems of urban IDPs. These projects should address children’s education, adult 
literacy and skills training as well as employment creation and preferential loans for small business start-
ups. The numbers of community, women’s and children’s centres should be increased and they should be 
given capacity building training to serve the particular needs of the displaced. 
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Return
Security forces no longer hinder returns on the grounds of lack of safety in most areas where original 
displacement took place with the notable exception of Hakkâri. However, given that PKK assaults and 
military operations have increased in the past two years, fear for personal safety as well as perceptions 
of lack of security continue to prevent many IDPs from considering return to their original homes. The 
government should take further measures to provide security for returnees. Local NGOs and public 
authorities in the region should cooperate in building trust between IDPs and the state in order to remove 
perceptions of lack of safety in places where this is not the case. Other obstacles to return are the paucity 
of aid under the government’s Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project (RVRP), lack of infrastructure 
and public services in the rural areas from which original displacement took place and resistance against 
centralised settlements. The government should clarify its implementation of the RVRP in line with the 
Framework Document, and in consultation with NGOs. Concrete steps should be taken to rebuild the rural 
economy and public infrastructure so that returns may become sustainable. 
Property
The shortcomings in the Compensation Law and the problems in its implementation undermine its 
significance. The time-scale and scope of the law should be extended so as to cover all IDPs who were 
forcibly evicted or were obliged to flee due to the armed conflict. The law should be amended to provide 
non-pecuniary damages in accordance with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, in order to 
compensate the pain and suffering of IDPs whose rights to life, liberty and security, and property have been 
violated. The government should initiate a public information campaign on the law in Turkish and Kurdish, 
in collaboration with NGOs and local administrations. The Turkish Bar Association and local bar associations 
should advise their members on codes of professional conduct and monitor their implementation of the 
law. The commissions should be allowed to determine all types of damages on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the subjective circumstances of each case. The two-year period for evaluating petitions should 
be extended to a more realistic timeframe. To ensure unity in implementation, the government should 
develop a clear position on the law; send the commissions binding implementing guidelines and instruct 
them not to abide by strict formal evidentiary rules in processing claims; and cooperate with civil society 
to provide training not just to the governors and their deputies, but to all members of the commissions. 
As a first step, the government should publicly express its political support for the effective and just 
implementation of the law. The Commissions should not attribute evidentiary weight to the information 
provided by the jandarma (security forces). An administrative appeal body should be set up to evaluate the 
decisions of the commissions within a time limit of two-three months. To ensure their access to courts, IDPs 
should be exempted from legal fees in administrative courts and be provided with legal aid upon need. The 
structure of the commissions should be changed in favour of a balanced representation of civil society and 
the public sector. The commissions should be professionalised, their numbers should be increased, and their 
working conditions should be improved. 
Cooperation with International Partners
Since RSG Deng’s visit in 2002, an active cooperation has developed between the government and the 
UN on the IDP issue, culminating in the signing of an agreement in 2005 between the UNDP and the 
government to support the development of an IDP programme.  There is also a need for more systematic 
cooperation between the UN and NGOs. The UN and the government should encourage NGOs to participate 
in the implementation of policies targeting IDPs on the issues of return and reintegration. The European 
Commission has played a significant role in encouraging Turkey to take steps to address its IDP problem 
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since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey became a candidate for EU accession. The Commission 
should be more proactive in providing consultation and guidance to the government on its evolving IDP 
policy. The government may involve the EU into the policy implementation process through socioeconomic 
and other projects related to IDPs’ return and reintegration. 
Reconciliation
IDPs, NGOs and the government express the need for rebuilding “trust towards the state” and “social 
peace”, goals identified in the Compensation Law. Establishing social rehabilitation in the wake of a 
traumatic period of conflict and ensuing displacement cannot be limited to issues concerning the payment 
of reparations, return and reintegration, but should also include reconciliation. Although achieving 
reconciliation may take a long time, the government should take steps to initiate that process. The state’s 
public acknowledgement of responsibility for village evictions, introducing compensation for pain and 
suffering, and declaration of a will to identify and prosecute – where possible – those who committed 
human rights violations during displacement and return may be among such measures. However, it is also 
important to bear in mind that reconciliation would require the PKK to demonstrate a similar will to assume 
its responsibility for the human rights violations it has committed. A dialogue should be initiated between 
the civil society and the government to set up a structure for reconciliation, bearing in mind the examples 
of truth and reconciliation commissions elsewhere in the world. 
Background to the IDP situation in Turkey
During the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK between 1984 and 1999, massive 
internal displacement took place in the eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey. Although much time 
has passed, the social, economic, political and legal problems caused by the internal displacement of Turkish 
citizens of predominantly Kurdish ethnicity have not yet been resolved.
Internal displacement, or forced migration,6 was concentrated during the period in which the eastern and 
south-eastern region was ruled under a State of Emergency (Olağanüstü Hâl).7 The eviction and evacuation8 
of several hundred thousand people from their rural homes resulted in the violation of their constitutional 
and human rights, and created serious political and socio-economic problems. 
According to the 1998 report of the Turkish Parliament’s Investigation Commission,9 the causes of forced 
migration were the following: (a) people leaving their villages because of the collapse of animal husbandry 
and agriculture as a result of the ban on the use of pastures and as a result of PKK pressure, intensifying 
military operations and armed clashes; (b) the PKK’s eviction of people from certain villages and hamlets 
who agreed to become “village guards”, locally-recruited civilians armed and paid by the state to oppose 
the PKK; (c) the security forces’ eviction of villagers who refused to become village guards or who were 
thought to aid the PKK, and evacuation of villages where security could not be provided.10 These causes of 
forced migration roughly correspond to the definition of IDPs given in the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (hereafter “Guiding Principles”) as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced 
[causes (b) and (c) above] or obliged [cause (a) above] to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence” as a result of armed conflict, generalised violence and violations of human rights.11 
The interior ministry says that 358,335 people were displaced from 945 villages and 2,021 hamlets during 
the above-mentioned period and that 137,636 of them have returned to their homes since 1998, when the 
RVRP was initiated through a Prime Ministerial Circular.12 International organisations and domestic and 
6  In this report, the terms “internal displacement” and “forced migration” are used interchangeably. Although internal displacement 
is the internationally recognised term, this phenomenon has been known as forced migration (zorunlu göç) by the Turkish public. 
7  A state of emergency was first declared in a number of provinces in 1987, and then it was progressively expanded to cover 12 
provinces. After 1999, it was gradually phased out and it completely came to an end in 2002.
8  In this report, the terms “eviction” and “evacuation” are used interchangeably. This is because a majority of the IDPs were forcibly 
evicted from their homes, while others were evacuated for security reasons.   
9  The original title of the report is “Report of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission Established with the Aim of Investigating 
the Problems of our Citizens who Migrated due to the Eviction of Settlements in East and South-east Anatolia and to Assess the 
Measures that Need to be Taken”. Hereafter, we refer to it as the “Parliamentary Report”.  
10  Since 1985, provisional village guards (geçici köy korucusu) have been recruited from among the civilian rural population in the 
south-eastern and eastern regions to “guard” their villages against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), in return for which they 
receive arms and a salary from the government (see “Protection” below). 
11  Guiding Principles, Introduction, Article 2.
12  Bekir Sıtkı Dağ, Department of Strategy Development, MOI, Presentation at the “Support to the Development of an IDP Programme 
in Turkey Project” Workshop, 23 February 2006, Ankara (hereafter, “UNDP Workshop”). 
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foreign NGOs put the figure of IDPs in Turkey at between one and four million.13 These estimates are not 
supported by hard data; rather, they give an indication of the extent of the population affected by armed 
clashes and security problems in the region during the last 20 years. The ministry figures on the other hand 
only pertain to those who were “forced to flee or leave their homes”, that is, causes (b) and (c) indicated 
in the Parliamentary Report. Therefore, the actual number of IDPs must be higher than the official figure; 
however, NGO estimates are also unrealistically high if the total extent of population movements within 
Turkey is considered in the relevant period.14
Methodology
In his report to the UN Human Rights Commission, the RSG made 11 recommendations to two stakeholders: 
1) the government of Turkey, and 2) United Nations and other humanitarian organisations. The 
recommendations are grouped below under the following headings: Clarifying and Disseminating the 
National Policy, Data Collection, Protection, Current Conditions of the Displaced, Return, Property and 
Cooperation with International Agencies. Based on the need for addressing IDPs’ expectations for justice 
and peace, the TESEV Working Group added a new heading titled “Reconciliation”. This report assesses the 
progress in those areas, identifies points where problems still exist and makes some recommendations to 
address outstanding issues.
The report’s findings are based on fieldwork conducted by the authors in Istanbul, and the provinces of 
Batman, Diyarbakır and Hakkâri for the writing of the TESEV Report as well as further interviews and phone 
interviews conducted expressly for this report (see “Acknowledgments”). All in all, the fieldwork consisted 
of around 150 in-depth interviews based on open-ended questions with government officials, EU and UN 
representatives, province- and district-level public officials, municipal officials, lawyers, representatives of 
bar associations, NGO representatives, social service workers, and displaced persons. Some of the interviews 
with IDPs were conducted in a group format. The qualitative methodology of the fieldwork allowed the 
collection of rich and in-depth data about various processes; however its findings do not lend themselves to 
making generalisations about the entire IDP population or about the conditions of the entire region.
1. CLARIFYING AND DISSEMINATING THE NATIONAL   
 POLICY
1.1  Relevant Recommendations from the Representative
To the government of Turkey:
Clarification and dissemination of government policy on internal displacement: in order to reconcile the 
disparity between the prevailing negative perceptions of government policy and the positive attitude 
which the Representative witnessed during his mission, there is an urgent need for the government to 
clarify its policy on internal displacement, including return, resettlement and reintegration, to make 
that policy widely known, to create focal points of responsibility for the displaced at various levels 
of the government structures, and to facilitate coordination and cooperation among government 
institutions and with NGOs, civil society and the international community.
13  For instance, the US Committee for Refugees (USCR) has estimated the number of IDPs to be between 380,000 and 1 million. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has cited a figure of 2 million. Turkish Human Rights Foundation (THRF), Human Rights Association 
(HRA) and Göç-Der have used estimates of between 3 and 4 million in their reports and declarations. See, USCR, “The Wall of 
Denial – Internal Displacement in Turkey” (Washington D.C.: Committee for Refugees, 1999); HRW, “Displaced and Disregarded: 
Turkey’s Failing Village Return Program”, 2002, available from http://hrw.org/reports/2002/turkey/Turkey1002.pdf; and Joint Press 
Release by HRA, THRF, Göç-Der and other non-governmental organisations, 31 May 2001, available from http://www.tihv.org.
tr/basin/bas20010531.html.
14  For an analysis of population movements between the 1990 and 2000 General Population Censuses, see Turgay Ünalan, “Yerinden 
Olmuş Kişiler: Kavramlar ve Dünyada Durum”, presentation at Hacettepe University Workshop on the “Study on Migration and the 
Displaced Population in Turkey”, 4 March 2005, available from http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tgyona/idp_turkce/SayisalBoyut.
zip. 
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1.2 The Government Policy on Internal Displacement 
Certain steps have been taken by the government in cooperation with the UN since 2003, including the 
initiation of the “Hacettepe Survey” (see “Data Collection” below) and the enactment and implementation 
of the “Compensation Law”( see “Property” below), culminating in the formulation of the “Framework 
Document” (see “Framework Document” below).
The first public indication that the government was drafting a new policy was made during a working visit 
by the new RSG Walter Kälin to Ankara between 4 and 6 May 2005. Kälin publicly welcomed the Turkish 
government’s plan to develop a new strategy on internal displacement that would address all obstacles to 
return, including the role of village guards and the problem of landmines, in a comprehensive manner, and 
to provide the necessary means to make implementation a success.15 
The government formed a commission in December 2004 in order to formulate a strategy document 
outlining its policy on IDPs. The commission was composed of representatives from the interior ministry, 
the foreign ministry, the State Planning Organisation (SPO), the South-Eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and 
the State Institute of Statistics (SIS). The commission also gathered information from and consulted with 
the provincial governors in Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, as well as the UN and the Delegation of 
the European Commission to Turkey.
1.3 The Framework Document
The framework for the government strategy entitled “Measures on the Issue of Internally Displaced Persons 
and the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project in Turkey” (hereafter The “Framework Document”) 
was issued by the Council of Ministers as a special “Decision of Principle” (Prensip Kararı) on 17 August 
2005. The four-page paper is not a strategy document, but a framework that lays down the principles that 
will shape the final strategy to be adopted.16 As such, it has failed to meet expectations especially among 
NGOs for a detailed action plan by the government. 
The framework document, rather than specifying policies and their implementation, provides an indication 
of how the internal displacement issue will be handled by the government. Since it was a Decision of 
Principle, the Framework Document was not published in the Official Gazette.17 It reached the foreign 
ministry on 4 October 2005 and was distributed to the UN and the Delegation of the European Commission 
to Turkey on 10 October 2005. It was handed to deputy governors in a briefing held by the interior ministry 
in December 2005, where the deputy governors were informed that all decisions pertaining to the RVRP 
and the Compensation Law would from then on be made on the basis of this document.18 The Framework 
Document was sent to all relevant government offices. 
A key concern related to the development and presentation of the Framework Document is that NGOs 
were not sufficiently informed about the policy in order to meaningfully comment on its content. It was not 
directly distributed to NGOs, but the interior ministry claims that it is available to NGOs upon request.19 The 
ministry provided the Framework Document to the TESEV Working Group on request in early February 2006. 
However, other NGOs claimed they faced difficulties in obtaining the document. For example, Migrants’ 
Association for Social Solidarity and Culture (Göç-Der), an NGO working on internal displacement, said that 
the ministry did not provide them with the document although they asked for all IDP-related documents.20  
15  Press Release of Walter Kälin, “Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 
Sees New Hope for the Internally Displaced Persons in Turkey”, 05 May 2005, available from http://www.undp.org.tr/PressRelease_
9may05.asp.
16  An interior ministry official said that the government would design the strategy paper based on feedback from NGOs and other 
relevant parties. He said that a “strategy paper” should have an “action plan”, and since an action plan cannot be finalised 
without feedback and participation from NGOs, the existing document should be understood as a framework paper that declares 
the government’s intention to solve the IDP problem. Phone interview, 27 February 2006. 
17  The interior ministry intended to have the Decision of Principle published in the Official Gazette, but was informed that this was 
against common practice. Phone interview with interior ministry official, 27 February 2006.
18  Phone interview with a deputy governor in the region, 16 February 2006. 
19 An official at the ministry said that he would e-mail this document to any NGO which requests it from his office. However, he said, 
according to existing government practices in Turkey, the government is not “responsible” for distributing Council of Ministers 
decisions to NGOs. Phone interview, 27 February 2006.
20  Göç-Der said that an official from the South-eastern Anatolian Project (GAP) informally brought to their attention in Summer 
2005 that a document on internal displacement would soon be adopted. Following the amendment of the Compensation Law 
in December 2005, Göç-Der formally requested the interior ministry to share with them all the documents related to internal 
displacement, but received a written response that they should request this information from relevant governorships. Phone 
interview with Şefika Gürbüz, National Director of Göç-Der, 16 February 2006.
14
“OVERCOMING A LEGACY OF MISTRUST: TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE DISPLACED” Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the UN Representative on IDPs 
Moreover, NGOs and bar associations in Istanbul and the south-eastern region said that they were not 
aware of the Framework Document until it was brought to their attention by the TESEV Working Group in 
mid-February 2006. The first public mention of this document was made on 23 February 2006 by a ministry 
official at the “Support to the Development of an IDP Programme in Turkey Project” Workshop organised 
by the UNDP and the interior ministry (hereafter “UNDP Workshop”), to which most NGOs were invited. 
However, NGOs were not able to comment meaningfully on the content of the Framework Document, 
which was not distributed to them before or even during that meeting. After some delay, the interior 
ministry put the Framework Document on its home page on 15 March 2006.21
On the whole, the Framework Document is in line with the Guiding Principles, as recognised by the RSG 
at the UNDP Workshop. Most importantly, with this Framework Document, the government for the first 
time officially recognises the definition of internal displacement as laid down in the Guiding Principles.22 
Also in accordance with the Guiding Principles, the Framework Document lists the government’s objectives 
which include ensuring voluntary returns in safety;23 facilitating the necessary conditions for return and 
supporting development projects;24 seeking ways to provide assistance to facilitate IDPs’ integration 
in their new places of settlement;25 and reviewing legislation on return and integration.26 On another 
positive note, the document declares the government’s commitment to the effective implementation of 
the Compensation Law.27 
Under “Implementation Principles”, the Framework Document emphasises that returns will be voluntary 
and will not be dependent on any permission from authorities,28 but states that IDPs should notify the 
highest administrative authority in the area where they are returning.29 Complaints about village guards 
hindering returning IDPs will be handled swiftly,30 and obstacles to return arising from landmines will also 
be addressed.31 The document also promises sufficient consultation, cooperation and information exchange 
with NGOs in the implementation, monitoring and assessment process, and offers possible support for 
NGO projects on education, health, agriculture and employment.32 It also promises transparency in policy 
implementation.33 The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is designated the chief coordinator34 for the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies on internal displacement.35 On another positive note, the document 
promises to ensure the identification of responsibilities and the limitation of discretional authority of 
government agencies, and to ensure uniformity in that regard.36 
As regards the content of the Framework Document, there is concern that displaced persons who were 
“obliged to flee or leave their homes” as a result of the effects of armed conflict and generalised violence 
in the south-east may be excluded from its scope since these individuals are not included as populations of 
concern in either the RVRP or the Compensation Law (see “Property” below). Another problematic point 
is that the document supports the formation of “central villages”.37 The creation of central villages has 
not been met with much success in the past because IDPs have not been willing to resettle in places other 
than their original villages or hamlets.38 The document also notes that aid under the RVRP will be given to 
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21  http://www.icisleri.gov.tr/_Icisleri/Web/Gozlem2.aspx?sayfaNo=722.
22  Framework Document, page 1, para. 2.
23  Ibid. Objective 1.
24  Ibid. Objective 2.
25  Ibid. Objective 6.
26  Ibid. Objective 8.
27  Ibid. Objective 7.
28  Ibid. Implementation Principle 1.
29  Ibid. Implementation Principle 2. An interior ministry official emphasised that notification in this context does not mean a need to 
get permission from security/state officers. Presentation at the UNDP Workshop. 
30  Ibid. Implementation Principle 5. The wording of this principle is rather vague; however, an interior ministry official explained that 
this principle pertained to complaints about village guards’ intimidation of returning IDPs or their illegal occupation and/or use of 
IDP property. Presentation at the UNDP Workshop.
31  Ibid. Implementation Principle 6.
32  Ibid. Implementation Principle 10.
33  Ibid. Implementation Principle 11.
34  Ibid. Implementation Principle 9.
35  Currently, there are several different departments within the interior ministry that deal with the Return to Village and Rehabilitation 
Project (RVRP), village guards, and the implementation of the Compensation Law, a situation which may have the effect of slowing 
down the implementation of internal displacement policy. It may be argued that the coordination of all internal displacement-
related activities by a single office would be beneficial for more efficient implementation. 
36  Framework Document, Implementation Principle 13.
37  Framework Document, Objective 5.
38  For instance, a member of the parliament (MP) and several villagers were reported as expressing the “involuntary” nature of 
IDP settlements in the central village of Konalga in the Çatak township of Van province. See HRW, “Displaced and Disregarded: 
Turkey’s Failing Village Return Program”, 2002, pages 31-32, available from http://hrw.org/reports/2002/turkey/Turkey1002.pdf. An 
IDP from a hamlet of the Konalga village told the TESEV Working Group that his family refused to live in this central village and 
therefore lost the opportunity to receive any other aid from the RVRP. Interview in Istanbul, July 2005. Another IDP from Tunceli 
said that his family in recent years turned down an offer of a house in a planned central village in Hozat township because they 
wanted to return to their own village. Interview in Istanbul, July 2005.
returnees if the population of their village is above 150 persons (or above 30 households).39 Considering the 
fact that the document also supports investments in “central villages” and “centres of attraction”40 for the 
purpose of concentrating public services, an underlying effect of this implementation principle may be to 
encourage more concentrated settlements and discourage the resettlement of hamlets.  
Overall, the developments since Deng’s visit can be seen as positive steps towards improving the 
government’s internal displacement policy. In particular, cooperation with the UNDP on this matter has 
already borne positive results. Even though progress has been slow, the intention to cooperate with the UN 
has facilitated policy changes. A recent agreement between the UNDP and the foreign ministry foresees not 
only more UN consultation with the government on data collection but also UN support for NGOs, including 
capacity-building on the Guiding Principles and policy guidance to the government (see “Cooperation with 
International Agencies” below). Within this collaboration, the government recently finalised the translation 
of the Guiding Principles and its Annotations into Turkish in cooperation with the Brookings-Bern Project on 
Internal Displacement and UNDP. Guiding Principles booklets have been distributed to the vice-governors 
of the 14 provinces that have been affected by internal displacement. They were also made available to 
NGOs at the UNDP Workshop in Ankara. 
It has taken two years for the government to issue a framework document; however, there is now the 
opportunity for the government, with the support and involvement of the international community and 
civil society, to issue an appropriate strategy and plan of action in a shorter time period. 
Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
The government’s acknowledgment of the internal displacement problem, its expression of political will to 
address the issue in accordance with the Guiding Principles and its commitment to develop an IDP strategy 
based on the Framework Document constitute significant progress. However, these are also belated steps 
in the aftermath of a period of inaction, with the exception of the RVRP. The lack of transparency and NGO 
participation are also grounds for concern. In order to facilitate meaningful participation of civil society 
and to raise awareness among the affected IDP communities about government policy, the Framework 
Document should be immediately and widely distributed. The government should systematically consult 
with NGOs in putting together and implementing a strategy based on the Framework Document. With 
regard to establishing a structure for the implementation of its policy, the government should create a focal 
point of responsibility within the interior ministry, which would coordinate cooperation with government 
institutions, civil society organisations and the international community, and set aside a transparent and 
accountable budget with sufficient funds.
39  Framework Document, Implementation Principle 3. According to the interior ministry, this implementation principle means that 
aid in the form of infrastructure investments (building of schools, etc) would be dispensed if the village population is above 150 
persons, which is a stipulation of the Village Law (Law no. 442) that is implemented in the same way everywhere in the country. 
In the meantime, sub-provincial governors and governors will continue to give individual returnee households aid in the form of 
materials for reconstructing their homes, etc. UNDP Workshop.
40  Ibid, Implementation Principle 4. The policy of building “central villages” (merkez köy), “centres of attraction” (cazibe merkezi) 
and “village townships” (köy-kent) for purposes of centralising rural settlements and/or public services in rural areas with declining 
populations have existed in Turkey for some time. 
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2. DATA COLLECTION
2.1 Relevant Recommendations from the Representative 
To the government of Turkey:
Collection of data on the nature and scale of the problem:  in order to gain a more accurate 
picture of the immediate needs of the displaced vis-à-vis the larger population, and in view of 
the government’s current efforts to facilitate return and resettlement, there is a need for more 
comprehensive and reliable data on the number of persons displaced as a result of the actions 
of both the PKK and the security forces, on their current whereabouts, conditions and specific 
needs, and on their intentions with respect to return or resettlement.  It is recommended that 
the government, in cooperation with local NGOs and civil society organisations which are in daily 
contact with displaced communities in the south-east and throughout the country, undertake a 
comprehensive survey of the displaced population to better inform ongoing efforts to meet their 
needs and to facilitate return and resettlement.
2.2 Hacettepe Survey
One of the fruits of the increased dialogue between international organisations and the government 
has been the commissioning of Hacettepe University’s Institute of Population Studies (HIPS) to conduct 
a comprehensive survey on IDPs in Turkey. HIPS conducted the survey in coordination with the SPO.41 
The survey’s stated approach is to work in a participative and transparent cooperation with national and 
international institutions and in accordance with academic freedom. 42 
2.2.1 Objectives and Methodology of the Survey
The objectives of the Hacettepe Survey are to produce qualitative and quantitative findings which 
can be used to develop a model on the sustainability and rehabilitation of the settlements suitable 
for return; design social and political measures for making IDPs productive again; and to identify the 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, causes and processes of displacement as well as the 
current problems of IDPs.43 The final report will contain policy proposals on facilitating the return, 
resettlement and reintegration of IDPs, and on the sustainability of regional development plans and 
guidelines to diminish regional development gaps.44
The survey consists of two components: (i) a qualitative component made up of in-depth interviews aimed 
at identifying IDPs’ experiences and problems, and at looking ahead to their future choices. These were 
interviews with government offices and NGOs, and 70 individual interviews with IDPs in Diyarbakır, Batman, 
Istanbul, Van, Adana and Mersin; and (ii) a quantitative component conducted in 14 provinces of origin (for 
a list of these, see “Return” below), ten receiving provinces (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, 
Antalya, Malatya, Manisa and Kocaeli), and eight randomly selected provinces (Tekirdağ, Muğla, Burdur, 
Bolu, Aksaray, Kars, Giresun and Çankırı) among the remaining 57 provinces.45 The survey questionnaire 
was prepared in accordance with the Guiding Principles and was completed by 7,316 individuals.46 
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41  The State Planning Organisation (SPO) is the leading government agency that coordinates economic and social policy in various 
fields and provides guidelines for the allocation of resources in business and social sectors through its five-year development plans 
and annual programmes. 
42  Sabahat Tezcan, Director, Hacettepe University’s Institute of Population Studies (HIPS). Presentation at the UNDP Workshop.
43  Information on the Hacettepe Survey on HIPS website, available at http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tgyona/tgyona_eng.htm.
44  Ibid. 
45  Sinan Türkyılmaz, Field Director, “Update on Status of Migration and IDP Survey” presented at the UNDP Workshop.
46  Sabahat Tezcan, Director, HIPS. Presentation at the UNDP Workshop.
The survey was officially started in December 2004. Following the analysis of existing information and 
conducting preliminary studies up to April 2005, the fieldwork was initiated in the eastern and south-
eastern provinces in September 2005, then moved to the western and southern part of the country, and 
completed in November 2005. As of May 2006, the survey was at the stage of data analysis and report 
preparation.47 The report will be submitted to the Steering Committee through the SPO and discussed at a 
broad-based meeting with participation from public institutions, NGOs and the international community 
to to be held in 2006.48
 
It should be noted here that the Hacettepe Survey is supposed to provide statistically more relevant data 
than a study carried out by the Turkish Social Sciences Association in 2001 on behalf of the GAP and whose 
findings were disclosed in 2002. That study’s outputs were “sub-regional development plans”49 for selected 
rural areas in 12 provinces where displacement had taken place.50 
2.2.2 Cooperation with NGOs and Transparency 
HIPS briefed NGOs and international organisations about the Hacettepe Survey through two workshops 
held on 16 July 2004 and 4 March 2005, and cooperated with some of them in the field. A third meeting 
with representatives of international organisations was held in Ankara during Walter Kälin’s working visit 
on 4 May 2005.
NGOs agree that they were informed and consulted by HIPS at the beginning of the survey, and some 
NGOs even assisted the HIPS team in reaching IDP communities.51 For example, Şefika Gürbüz, the National 
Director of Göç-Der, commended HIPS for this consultation; however, she said that HIPS did not keep its 
promise to cooperate with NGOs in determining the urban neighbourhoods where the survey would take 
place in IDP-receiving cities.52 Likewise, a lawyer in Diyarbakır working with IDPs as well as the Director of 
the Diyarbakır Branch of Göç-Der said that although HIPS requested their cooperation at the beginning of 
the survey, the researchers did not maintain this cooperation throughout the surveying process.53 Another 
criticism came from Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the ground that HIPS had not kept its assurances at the 
start of the survey that it would differentiate between village guard and non-village guard settlements.54 
Thus, while HIPS has consulted NGOs from time to time and held workshops on its research design, it 
has not shared the survey questionnaire or established an ongoing cooperation with NGOs during the 
implementation phase.55 
 
HIPS has not been forthcoming with the findings of the survey. Their presentation at the UNDP Workshop 
on 23 February 2006 fell short of expectations in that it provided detailed information about the objectives 
and methodology of the survey but did not touch upon its findings. That HIPS was unable to share the 
preliminary findings of the survey nearly four months after the completion of the fieldwork goes against 
their stated approach about being transparent. Likewise, HIPS limited its presentation to the survey (the 
quantitative component) and did not give any information about when the findings of the qualitative 
component would be announced or what its preliminary findings were.56 
Further development of government policy, international cooperation and possible future projects are pending 
on the results of the Hacettepe Survey, so the completion and dissemination of the results are crucial. 
47  Ibid.
48  Ibid. 
49  The “sub-regional plans” proposed models for the delivery of public services and the patterning of rural settlements in 12 rural 
areas based on the results of focus group interviews with IDPs in south-eastern provinces. See, for instance, Türk Sosyal Bilimler 
Derneği, “Bingöl İli Genç İlçesi Yağızca Köyü ve Çevresi Alt Bölge Gelişme Planı” in Doğu ve Güneydoğu Bölgesi Köye Dönüş ve 
Rehabilitasyon Projesi Alt Bölge Gelişme Planları, 2002, Ankara: GAP (all twelve plans are available in a document CD at the GAP 
Office in Ankara).
50  UNDP and European Commission (EC) officials working with the government team on the IDP issue acknowledge the findings of 
that research, but they say they have concluded that it did not provide a statistically-grounded estimate of the numbers and needs 
of displaced people. 
51  For instance, Akdeniz Göç-Der helped the HIPS team in reaching IDPs in Mersin. Phone interview with Ahmet Kalpak, Director of 
Göç-Der’s Diyarbakır Branch, 27 February 2006; and written communication with Şefika Gürbüz, 22 February 2006.
52 Written communication with Şefika Gürbüz, 22 February 2006.  
53  Phone interviews with Mahsuni Karaman, Migration Coordinator in Diyarbakır Bar Association, 25 February 2006, and with Ahmet 
Kalpak, Director of Göç-Der’s Diyarbakır Branch, 27 February 2006.
54  Written communication with Jonathan Sugden of HRW, 9 March 2006. Sugden said that this exchange between HRW and HIPS 
took place during the workshop of 4 March 2005.  
55  Apparently, the UNDP saw, and provided HIPS with feedback on, a draft of the questionnaire, but the questionnaire has not been 
made public otherwise. Interview with UNDP official, 14 February 2006, Ankara. 
56  The original time plan for the Hacettepe Survey mentions a report on the findings of the qualitative research. Presentation at the 
HIPS Workshop on 4 March 2005, available from http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/tgyona/sunum.htm.
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2.2.3  The Ability of Academics and NGOs to Conduct Research    
 on Displacement in Turkey
Following the presentation of the TESEV Report to the interior Minister in early October 2005 and its 
public launch on 28 October 2005, Turgay Ünalan, a member of the TESEV Working Group and Technical 
Director of the Hacettepe Survey, was informed by the President’s Office of Hacettepe University that he 
would be investigated on the basis of a letter the SPO had sent to the university. In November 2005, 
Ünalan received written notice that he was removed from his duties in the Hacettepe Survey due to the 
ongoing investigation. The grounds for the investigation were that he took part in another project without 
authorisation from the university and that he violated the confidentiality of the Hacettepe Survey. As of 31 
May 2006, the investigation continues. 
Both TESEV and Turgay Ünalan’s colleagues at the TESEV Working Group, including the authors of this 
report, consider this investigation to be an infringement of academic freedom in general and Ünalan’s 
academic freedom in particular. It is a generally accepted practice at university faculties in Turkey to work 
in more than one research project on a given topic. When TESEV invited Ünalan to become a member of 
the Working Group, it asked HIPS to give authorisation for his participation in the group’s activities. It 
is the TESEV Working Group’s understanding that HIPS then gave the requisite permission. Both TESEV 
and the TESEV Working Group are concerned that the investigation against Ünalan could potentially 
discourage academics from working on internal displacement and other issues which are still considered to 
be “politically sensitive” in Turkey.          
In addition, it is of concern that other researchers investigating human rights abuses have recently been 
confronted with restrictions. Jonathan Sugden, a HRW researcher who was conducting research on abuses 
allegedly involving the gendarmerie and village guards in the south-east, was detained and subsequently 
deported on the ground that he lacked valid authorisation to carry out research.57 
Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
The commissioning of Hacettepe University to conduct a comprehensive study on IDPs is a significant step 
towards understanding the causes of internal displacement, and identifying the current conditions and 
needs of the displaced. The initiation of the survey has raised expectations that the findings of the study 
will facilitate the development of government policy, international cooperation and possible future NGO 
projects. However, Hacettepe University has so far not shared the findings of the study, the quantitative 
component of which was completed in November 2005. The findings of both the qualitative and quantitative 
components of the Hacettepe Survey should be disclosed completely and without further delay. The SPO 
and the Hacettepe University should take steps to ensure that the academic freedom of scholars studying 
internal displacement is respected.
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57 HRW, “Turkey: Human Rights Watch Researcher Detained in Kurdish Area”, 12 April 2006, available from http://www.hrw.org/
english/docs/2006/04/12/turkey13171.htm. In a statement, HRW said that “Sugden was present in the country on a tourist visa, 
which Turkish authorities had confirmed provides a legitimate basis for him to carry out research in the country, as it is and has 
been for any human rights lawyer or delegation carrying out similar work.”  
3. PROTECTION
3.1 Relevant Recommendations from the Representative 
To the government of Turkey:
(i) Clarifying the role of the security forces in the return process:  the government should 
ensure that the role of the security forces, or jandarma, in the return process is primarily one of 
consultation on security matters, as the government told the RSG was the case.  Displaced persons 
who have been granted permission by the authorities to return to their villages – the decision being 
based on the advice of the jandarma – should be allowed to do so without unjustified or unlawful 
interference by the jandarma;
(ii) Disarmament and abolition of the village guards system:  the government should take steps 
to abolish the village guard system and find alternative employment opportunities for existing 
guards.  Until such time as the system is abolished, the process of disarming village guards should 
be expedited;
(iii) Mine clearance:  given the government’s commitment to accede to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 
Destruction and its expertise and role in demining activities overseas, and in view of the serious 
obstacle which landmines pose to the safe return of displaced persons, the government is strongly 
urged to undertake mine clearance activities in the relevant areas of the south-east to which 
displaced persons are returning, so as to facilitate that process.
3.2 The Role of the Security Forces in the Return Process 
The RSG called on the government to clarify the role of the security forces in the return process.  In particular, 
he asked the government to ensure that the role of the security forces, or jandarma (gendarmerie),58  in 
the return process is primarily one of consultation on security matters, and also underlined that displaced 
persons should be allowed to return without unjustified or unlawful interference by the jandarma. As stated 
above under “Clarifying and Disseminating the National Policy”, the Framework Document states that IDPs 
do not require “any permission” to return to their homes and “the issues related to the security conditions 
of the places subject to returns will be coordinated by the governorships with the relevant authorities”.59 
Overall, there have been no reports of unlawful interference by security forces against returning IDPs in 
recent years. 
3.3 Disarmament and Abolition of the Village Guards 
The position of provisional village guards (geçici köy korucusu) was created on 26 March 1985 through a 
clause added by Law no. 3175 to the 1924 Village Law (Law no. 442).60 They were hired pursuant to the 
decision of the cabinet of ministers, at the request of the interior ministry. Currently, this practice is in effect 
in 22 provinces. Not much is publicly known about the principles on which provisional village guards are 
hired and fired and what their duties precisely entail, since the Implementing Regulation (Yönetmelik) on 
Law no. 3175 is classified on the grounds that it pertains to “national security”.61 According to the interior 
ministry, as of 7 April 2006 there were 57,174 provisional village guards in the region.62 In addition, there 
are also voluntary village guards (gönüllü köy korucusu), or civilians who volunteer to become village 
58  The Gendarmerie Command (Jandarma Komutanlığı) is one of the four commands in the Turkish Armed Forces. The jandarma is 
in charge of security in rural areas of the country. Although the Gendarmerie Command is nominally under the administrative 
structure of the interior ministry, in practice, it falls under the authority of the Chief of General Staff. As such, the jandarma has 
been in the forefront of the Turkish army’s fight against the PKK in the eastern and south-eastern regions.
59  Framework Document, Implementation Principle 2.
60  Köy Kanunu’nun 74üncü Maddesine İki Fıkra Eklenmesine Dair Kanun [Law on the Addition of two Provisions to Article 74 of the 
Village Law], no. 3175, 26 March 1985. This information is based on the publication in the Official Gazette of a decision rejecting 
a request for the annulment of Law no. 3175. Resmi Gazete, no. 18995, 21 January 1986. 
61  Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek’s written answer to a question by MP Mesut Değer, 2 June 2005, available from http://www2.tbmm.
gov.tr/d22/7/7-5667c.pdf.
62  Information provided upon request by the Public Relations Department of the interior ministry, 24 April 2006 (on file with the 
TESEV Working Group).
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guards with the stated purpose of protecting themselves and their families against the PKK. While they 
are provided with arms by the local authorities, they do not receive a salary and are not authorised to take 
part in military operations.63 The legal basis of this position is also Law no. 442. Voluntary village guards 
are hired by sub-provincial governors. According to Abdülkadir Aksu, there were 12,279 voluntary village 
guards in the region as of 30 November 2003.64 
In principle, the hiring of both provisional and voluntary village guards was discontinued in accordance with 
a government decree in 2000.65 However, a recent local news account reported that 650 voluntary village 
guards had been hired in the Sason district of Batman.66 In response to the TESEV Working Group’s query, an 
interior ministry official said that “these people had volunteered to protect their villages themselves”, that 
the sub-provincial governor’s office had merely registered their names, and that they were not provided 
with firearms. He reiterated that it had not been legal to recruit village guards in the region since 2000.67
According to the interior ministry, 5,139 provisional village guards “committed crimes” between 1985 and 
April 2006, and 868 of them were arrested. Among the crimes committed, 2,391 were “terror related”, 964 
were crimes directed against property, 1,341 were against individuals and 443 were related to smuggling.68 
As of December 2003, 264 voluntary village guards were convicted for crimes such as murder and attempted 
murder, violation of the firearms law, firing of arms in public places, forestry products smuggling, and 
arms smuggling. Seventy-eight voluntary guards were convicted of aiding and abetting the PKK.69 The 
national media have carried various stories in recent years about village guards’ criminal activities such as 
the abduction of women, aggravated assault and forming armed gangs.  
Despite all the evidence about criminal incidents involving the village guards, there is no indication that the 
government is planning to disarm the village guards and abolish the village guard system, as called for by 
the RSG Deng. In fact, far from disarmament, an interior ministry Regulation (İçişleri Bakanlığı Yönetmeliği) 
in 2003 permitted village guards who resigned from the system as well as the legal heirs of deceased village 
guards to continue to legally possess arms previously provided by the authorities.70 
The main initiative to address the issue is a draft law on the village guards currently being finalised by the 
interior ministry; however, the law apparently does not include measures for the abolition of the system. 
The TESEV Working Group was told that the purpose of the draft law was to improve the social and 
economic conditions of provisional guards.71 The Minister of Interior has said that work was under way to 
provide social security benefits to provisional village guards72 in order to “meet their demands and solve 
problems pertaining to the provisional village guard system”.73 But there is no indication that a government 
effort exists to develop a centralised programme to provide alternative employment to provisional village 
guards, though some news reports about local efforts to employ them in other sectors have appeared in 
the past few years.74 
As mentioned in “Clarifying and Disseminating the National Policy” above, the Framework Document 
indicates that “complaints concerning provisional village guards will be given priority within the framework 
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63  Interview with a public official in the region. Summer 2005. 
64 Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu’s written answer to a question by MP Mesut Değer, 12 December 2003, available from http://
www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/7/7-1471c.pdf.
65  MOI presentation at the UNDP Workshop.
66  See, “Sason’da 2 bin 259 Korucu”, Batman Gazetesi, 16 June 2005, available from http://www.bianet.org/2005/06/16/62517.htm.
67  Phone interview with an interior ministry official, 27 February 2006.
68  Information provided upon request by the Public Relations Department of the interior ministry, 24 April 2006 (on file with the 
TESEV Working Group), and Minister of Interior Abdülkadir Aksu’s written answer to a question by MP Türkân Miçooğulları, 14 
June 2005, available from http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d22/7/7-6226c.pdf.
69  See Minister of Interior, footnote 64.
70 Geçici ve Gönüllü Köy Korucularının Ellerinde Bulundurdukları Ruhsatsız Silahların Teslimi ve Ruhsata Bağlanması Hakkında 
Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik [Implementing Regulation on the Submission and Licensing of Unlicensed 
Guns Possessed by Provisional and Voluntary Village Guards], Resmi Gazete, no. 25110, 16 May 2003, available from http://rega.
basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2003/05/20030516.htm#4.
71  The interior ministry refused to share the draft law with the TESEV Working Group on the grounds that this could cause speculations 
over a text that had not yet been finalised.
72  At the beginning of 2006, an amendm ent to the Village Law was put into effect allowing currently employed provisional village 
guards and those who have served at least 10 years in the past as well as all their legal dependents to be provided with the “green 
card”, the free healthcare programme for the poor (See “Current Conditions” below). Köy Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair 
Kanun [Law on the Amendment of the Village Law], no. 5443, Resmi Gazete, no. 26042, 3 January 2006, available from http://rega.
basbakanlik.gov.tr/Eskiler/2006/01/20060103-3.htm.
73  See Minister of Interior, footnote 68. 
74  For instance, in 2000 and 2003, the governor of Şırnak province reportedly sought to employ provisional village guards as janitors 
in schools, but this attempt appears to have met with resistance by some guards who considered such work to be inferior. See, 
for example, http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=11772 and http://www.evrensel.net/03/01/17/kose.
html#2. 
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of returns”.75 While it is positive that problems related to the village guards are addressed for the first time 
in the government policy, it is of concern that no mention is made of abolishing the system or of disarming 
the village guards, as recommended by the RSG. Overall, the interior ministry’s position is that the village 
guard system is necessary to guarantee the security of returning IDPs; ministry officials justify this argument 
by saying that the safety of returns is also emphasised in the Guiding Principles.76 This is in contrast to the 
position of many civil society organisations which identify the village guards as a security concern for IDPs 
and returnees because of the numerous human rights abuses committed by provisional village guards in 
the past. 
3.4 Human Rights Abuses Against Returnees
In the last couple of years, reports of human rights abuses in the region have gone down considerably.77 
In line with this, reports of harassment of IDPs by village guards on the grounds that the guards hindered 
them from returning have also declined;78 and in the few cases that have been reported, the perpetrators 
have been taken to court. 
There were two reported cases a few years ago in which village guards illegally occupied agricultural 
property belonging to returning IDP families. In one case, village guards shot at eight returning families in 
the Bismil district of Diyarbakır in September 2002, killing three people and injuring several others. After 
the incident appeared in the national media, public authorities took measures to provide security for the 
returnees and arrested the village guards.79 In another incident, three IDPs who visited their village to 
harvest plants in summer 2002 were killed by village guards who had occupied their farms in the Nurettin 
village of the Malazgirt district of Muş province.80 In autumn 2004, village guards who had occupied the 
homes of Assyrian families in villages of the İdil and Midyat districts of Şırnak and Mardin provinces were 
removed by the jandarma so that the families could return to their homes.81 
Assaults on IDPs are not frequent and public authorities handle such cases once they are reported. However, 
TESEV Working Group interviews with IDPs living in the provincial centres of Diyarbakır, Hakkâri and Batman 
indicate that there continue to be incidents in which village guards illegally cut trees, harvest produce from 
or graze their animals in displaced families’ property and pose a perceived threat for returnees as well as a 
hindrance to the return of other IDPs who are contemplating return.82 
The village guards are more numerous in some provinces and districts than others; therefore, this threat is 
not uniform in all return areas.83 IDPs usually report violations carried out by village guards to NGOs such 
as Human Rights Association (HRA) and Foundation for Society and Legal Studies (TOHAV), and to bar 
associations which then bring the cases to courts and the attention of the media.
3.5 Mine Clearance
Turkey acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the “Ottawa Convention”) on 25 September 2003. The 
government recently also committed itself in the Framework Document to address “problems caused by 
landmines laid by the terrorist organisations in the context of returns”.84 These two initiatives are positive 
developments towards fulfilling the RSG’s recommendation related to mine clearance. 
The Ottawa Convention entered into force in Turkey on 1 March 2004. On 1 October 2004, Turkey submitted 
its first Article 7 report covering the period between 1 March and 28 August 2004 (hereafter, “Turkey’s first 
75  Framework Document, Implementation Principle 5. 
76  Interior ministry official speaking at the UNDP Workshop.
77  HRA’s Annual Report for 2005, available from http://www.ihd.org.tr. Hereafter, HRA Report- 2005. 
78  Ibid. For instance, HRA said in its annual report that there were 14 cases of torture and ill treatment by provisional village guards 
in 2005. It did not specify where these incidents occurred.  
79  For instance, see Şeyhmuz Çakan and Ahmet Şık, “Korucular Yakalandı”, Radikal, 29 September 2002, available from http://www.
radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=51620&tarih=29/09/2002.
80  For instance, see Celal Başlangıç, “Kanatan Yara Koruculuk”, Radikal, 22 July 2002, available from http://www.radikal.com.tr/
veriler/2002/07/22/haber_44153.php.
81  Faruk Balıkçı and Muzaffer Duru, “Sari Köyü Asıl Sahiplerine Teslim Edildi”, and  Nazif Iflazoğlu, “Süryanilerin Derdi Güvenlik”, 
both in Radikal, 25 September 2004, page 5. 
82  For instance, interviews with three IDPs in Diyarbakır, February 2005, and one IDP from Van in Istanbul, July 2005.
83  For the distribution of village guards in different provinces, see Minister of Interior, footnote 68.
84  Framework Document, Implementation Principle 6.
22
“OVERCOMING A LEGACY OF MISTRUST: TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE DISPLACED” Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the UN Representative on IDPs 
Article 7 Report”).85 It submitted an annual update on 10 May 2005 for the period between 1 January and 
31 December 2004 (hereafter, “Turkey’s second Article 7 Report”).86 The third report covering the calendar 
year 2005 is due in the upcoming months.   
The exact numbers and locations of landmines in Turkey are unknown. The only official information on 
this issue can be found in the Article 7 reports the Turkish government has submitted to the UN Secretary-
General on the implementation of its treaty obligations and the presentations it has made at various UN 
standing committee meetings. In its first Article 7 report, Turkey declared a stockpile of just under three 
million anti-personnel mines,87 920,000 already laid in 15 areas88 and 687 suspected to be placed in seven 
provinces.89 Turkey had already ceased its production of anti-personnel mines and suspended their sale 
and transfer in 1996.90 Furthermore, the Turkish Armed Forces are banned from using mines pursuant to a 
directive from the Chief of General Staff on 26 January 1998.91
While the government’s commitment in the Framework Document to address the landmine issue is positive, 
it is problematic that the document does not address landmines laid by the Turkish Armed Forces. Similarly, 
Turkey’s Article 7 reports do not specify who had laid landmines, nor the date and location of their 
placement. According to NGO reports, there are landmines around security compounds, along the border 
with all neighbouring countries in the east and south-east, and in some inhabited areas away from the 
borders as well as around the villages “evacuated for security reasons”.92 NGOs state that these landmines 
have been placed by both the government and the PKK.93  
The Framework Document does not express a commitment to undertake mine clearance activities, as 
recommended by the RSG. Upon a query by the TESEV Working Group, an interior ministry official said the 
state guarantees the clearance of the mines, but he did not elaborate on how or when this will be done.94 
Turkey’s annual Article 7 reports do not provide information on the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel 
mines, and merely state that such activities are ongoing. In an official statement to the UN, the government 
said stockpiled mines will be destroyed following the completion of the Mine and Ordinance Disposal 
Facility in 2006.95 As for the clearing of deployed landmines, Turkey reported in its Article 7 report that it 
has destroyed 1,225 of them, but did not specify where the clearance activities took place.96 In a separate 
statement, the government reported it had initiated these activities in 1998 in Diyarbakır, Batman, Mardin, 
Bitlis, Bingöl, Tunceli and Göle.97 However, NGO reports contest that statement with respect to Diyarbakır 
and Mardin, based on the fieldwork conducted in these provinces.98 NGOs also criticise the government for 
concentrating its mine clearance activities along the border areas and neglecting residential areas within 
the country.99 Turkey has also reported that it intends to retain 16,000 antipersonnel mines for the training 
and development of the Turkish Armed Forces,100 the second highest number of retained mines among 
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.101 However, the government also noted that this figure may be 
reassessed in line with the downsizing of the armed forces.102 
85  While the report does not indicate a date of submission, the official date listed by the UN is 1 October 2004. International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Monitor Report 2005-Turkey, 2005, footnote 4, available at www.icbl.org (hereafter 
“Landmine Monitor Report”).
86  The report cites a submission date of 30 April 2004, but it actually means 30 April 2005. Phone interview with an official at the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs of the MFA, 07 March 2006. The date 
of submission listed by the UN is 10 May 2005. Landmine Monitor Report, footnote 5.
87  First Article 7 Report, Form B.
88  Ibid., Form C. These areas are: Ardahan, Batman, Diyarbakır, Doğubeyazıt, Gaziantep, Hakkâri, İskenderun, Kağızman, Kars, 
Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa,Şırnak, Tunceli and Van. 
89  Ibid. Provinces suspected to contain mines are: Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Mardin, Tunceli, Şırnak, Siirt.
90  Landmine Monitor Report, page 2.
91  Ibid, page 4.
92  Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey, Information on Landmines in Turkey, http://www.mayinsizbirturkiye.org/. 
93  Ibid. See also Landmine Monitor Report, page 5.
94  Bekir Sıtkı Dağ, UNDP Workshop.
95  Landmine Monitor Report, page 3, citing “Statement Made by Turkey on 13 June 2005 at the Ottawa Treaty Intercessional 
Meeting”, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005. 
96  Second Article 7 Report, Form G.
97  Landmine Monitor Report, page 7, citing “Presentation by Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education 
and Mine Action Technologies”, Geneva, 11 February 2004. 
98  Ibid, citing the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey, “Report on visits to Diyarbakır and Mardin”, 13-17 June and 20 July 2004; and the 
confirmation of this information by HRA Diyarbakır.
99  For a critique by the HRA, see Tolga Korkut, “İHD Mayına Karşı Eğitim Kampanyası Başlatıyor”, Bianet, 25 April 2006, available from 
http://www.bianet.org/2006/04/25/78172.htm. The coordinator of the mine project of the Diyarbakır Bar Association expressed a 
similar view. Tolga Korkut, “Türkiye’nin Hâlâ Mayın Politikası Yok”, Bianet, 05 April 2004. http://www.bianet.org/2006/04/05/77224.
htm.
100 Second Article 7 Report, Form D.
101 Landmine Monitor Report, page 3.
102 Ibid, page 4, citing “Statement by Turkey on 13 June 2005 at the Ottawa Treaty Intercessional Meeting”, Standing Committee on 
Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 13 June 2005. 
103 Second Article 7 Report, Form I.
104 Landmine Monitor Report, page 7.
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Turkey reports that all mined areas are fenced and marked with permanent hazard signs in accordance with 
international standards; that both fences and hazard signs are checked periodically; that all land mines are 
monitored by guards 24 hours a day and that the residents are notified by local authorities about the existence 
of minefields.103 However, NGOs report that local people say that the fences around marked minefields 
are broken, and that “mines and UXO (unexploded ordinance) can be found in unmarked and unfenced 
locations in inhabited areas where, in the past, both government and opposition forces used them”.104 At 
the time of writing this report, the Turkish government has not yet conducted any mine risk education. While 
there are local initiatives to raise awareness105 and to provide legal aid to mine victims,106 the absence of a 
centrally-coordinated mine risk education and awareness programme is a cause of great concern.    
   
Landmines and UXO pose a significant threat to the lives of civilians as well as the military personnel in the 
south-east region. In its first Article 7 report, Turkey reported that a total of 400 armed forces personnel 
had been killed and 1,126 disabled due to landmine explosion between 1984 and 2004, but did not indicate 
the figures for civilian casualties.107 The casualties indicated in the second report were also limited to the 
death (25) and injury (123) of the military personnel for the period between 1 March 2004 and 1 March 
2005.108 However, the government provided official numbers for civilian casualties in a separate document: 
140 civilian mine/UXO related casualties (29 deaths and 111 injuries) in 2004 and 2005, including three killed 
and two injured children.109 NGO figures differ. According to the Human Rights Association (HRA), a total of 
69 deaths and 161 injuries were caused by landmines and UXOs in 2005 alone. 110  However, the HRA does 
not identify the location of these incidents nor specify whether, and if so how many, of these casualties 
may have been displaced people. The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey gives the following figures for 2004: 
at least 168 casualties, including 57 killed (35 of whom were civilians) and 111 injured (72 of whom were 
civilians).111 Whatever the actual figures may be, the high number of casualties among civilians calls into 
question the adequacy of the protection and warning mechanisms the government claims are in place.
Mines and unexploded shells are of particular concern in Hakkâri, a province which neighbours both Iran 
and Iraq and thus has been heavily mined along the border, and where there have been massive population 
movements both within the province and across international borders. The Hakkâri Anti-Landmine 
Awareness Campaign, a local NGO that has been conducting a field study to identify dangerous areas, 
keeps statistics on casualties and plans to launch a public awareness campaign aimed at educating civilians. 
The information to be released by this local NGO will be an important resource in this regard. According 
to a news release issued by this group, at least 50 people, mostly women and children, died in Hakkâri in 
2004 alone.112
Landmines represent a significant obstacle to return and a source of great security concern for returnees. 
While there are no figures on mine and UXO-related casualties among returnees, local NGO reports and 
media coverage as well as the TESEV Working Group’s missions in the region suggest that returnees 
constitute a vulnerable group because they return to rural areas where landmines and unexploded shells 
are concentrated. For example, during a visit to a village in Batman where IDPs have recently returned, 
villagers showed a local journalist accompanying the TESEV Working Group a large unexploded shell they 
had found in the vicinity of the village.113 Residents pointed out that this was not the first time they had 
found an unexploded shell near the village,114 that they were concerned for their security and “almost 
regretted that they had returned to their village”.115 Children may be especially at risk. In one village in 
105 A documentary film on landmines and uneploded ordinance (UXO) made by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey and broadcast 
in the national media is the first visual material on this issue in Turkey. Landmine Monitor Report, page 8. Also, the Hakkâri Anti-
Landmine Awareness Campaign is a notable local awareness-raising initiative. Similarly, the HRA has recently launched a mine risk 
education campaign. See Korkut, “İHD Mayına Karşı Eğitim Kampanyası Başlatıyor”, footnote 99.
106 In the context of its Justice for All Project, the Diyarbakır Bar Association provides legal aid to mine victims. Landmine Monitor 
Report, page 8.
107 First Article 7 Report, Form J.
108 Second Article 7 Report, Form J.
109 Landmine Monitor Report, page 9, citing Turkey’s Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, Permanent Mission to the UN in 
Geneva, 31 August 2005. 
110 HRA Annual Report- 2005. 
111 Landmine Monitor Report, page 9.
112 Press Release by the Hakkâri Anti-Landmine Awareness Campaign, “New Group Launches Anti-Landmine Campaign in Kurdish 
Region of Turkey”, 1 November 2004.  
113 The next day, this incident was covered in the local newspaper. “Dikkat Patlayabilir!”, Batman Çağdaş, 30 June 2005. 
114 Ibid. In the earlier case, the jandarma destroyed the UXO. 
115 Ibid. During TESEV Working Group’s fieldwork in this village, village guards who were assigned by the sub-provincial governor to 
accompany the team on the pretext of providing “security” told the team that the road might have been mined by the PKK. They 
then made the team members go along the road first. Batman, 29 June 2005.
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the Diyarbakır province, the TESEV Working Group was told by returnees that they were concerned for the 
safety of children who, they were afraid, could try to play with unexploded shells that they had seen near 
their homes. A lawyer in Batman told the TESEV Working Group that two children were killed in a village of 
the Sason district as a result of mine explosion while they were playing out in the fields.116 The prospect of 
post-return mine-related casualties in Hakkâri is a cause for particular concern, since almost no meaningful 
return has taken place there and the villages in the province have almost entirely been evacuated. A local 
NGO warns that a sudden return process undertaken to please the international community not preceded 
by an extensive survey and mine clearance initiative “could have devastating consequences”.117 HRA echoes 
this concern by stressing that the areas around villages from where people were evicted should be cleared 
of mines before returns take place to these areas.118 
Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
The village guard system poses a risk in terms of the protection of human rights in the region as well as an 
obstacle to IDP returns in some regions. Both provisional and voluntary village guards should be disarmed 
and the system should be disbanded. As part of their rehabilitation, village guards should be provided 
with social security coverage and alternative employment unless they have criminal records. Village guards 
should be employed in sectors other than education and security. In order to facilitate peace and security, 
PKK militants need to be reintegrated into society through complete disarmament. The way should also be 
opened for their employment unless they have engaged in criminal activities. The government and NGOs 
should cooperate in developing policies about the social reintegration of all parties to the conflict, and 
create mechanisms to resolve longstanding conflicts between the village guards and the rural population. 
The landmines issue is of great concern due to the lack of comprehensive statistics on their locations and 
numbers. Landmines and unexploded ordinance pose a significant threat to returning IDPs. The government 
and the armed forces should cooperate with local NGOs and international institutions to effectively and 
expeditiously tackle this problem. As a first step, the government needs to ensure that all mined and 
potentially mined areas are fenced and marked with clear signs. The government should also launch a 
centrally coordinated mine risk education campaign in Turkish and Kurdish, in cooperation with civil society, 
local administrations and international institutions.  
4. CURRENT CONDITIONS OF THE DISPLACED
4.1 Relevant Recommendations from the Representative 
To the government of Turkey:
Addressing the current conditions of the displaced:  while the improved possibilities for return must 
be welcomed, it should be recognised that the return of the displaced to their original homes and 
lands may be a lengthy process and that there is a need for the government, in the meantime, to 
enhance its efforts to address their current conditions, which are reported to be poor, in cooperation 
with NGOs and United Nations agencies.  It should be acknowledged that many of the social and 
economic problems affecting the displaced also confronted the host communities and that measures 
to address these are ongoing, including within the context of the GAP and in cooperation with 
local NGOs and United Nations agencies.  However, attention should be paid to addressing those 
problems that are specific to the displaced, such as access to adequate housing, health care and 
psychosocial care for women and children.
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116 Interview with Mustafa Yıldız, Batman, June 2005. Yıldız did not specify whether these children were returnees.
117 Press release by the Hakkâri Anti-Landmine Awareness Campaign. See footnote 112. 
118 Korkut, “IHD Mayına Karşı Eğitim Kampanyası Başlatıyor”, footnote 99.
4.2  Government Policy regarding the Current Conditions of the  
 Displaced
The Turkish government’s policy on internal displacement has so far neglected the specific problems of 
urban IDPs. Likewise, the European Commission, which monitors Turkey’s progress on this issue in its 
annual Progress Reports, has focused mostly on returns and has not paid much attention to IDPs’ current 
conditions.119 Therefore, the adoption of the Framework Document and the Hacettepe Survey are positive 
steps by the national authorities for the purpose of addressing the current conditions of the displaced. 
Although the Framework Document for the most part focuses on the implementation of the RVRP, it also 
notes that measures for providing support and assistance to IDPs to integrate into their new places of 
settlement will be explored, planned and implemented.120 In addition, estimating the number of urban IDPs 
and gathering information about their problems are among the stated aims of the Hacettepe Survey. One 
expectation is that the survey will help provide a more accurate picture of the current conditions of the 
displaced population living in cities. 
4.3 The Problems Faced by Urban IDPs
According to government figures, two thirds of the displaced population (approximately 240,000) have not 
returned to their original homes. The actual numbers of the displaced currently living in cities may in fact 
be much higher. Some of these urban IDPs no longer consider returning to their original homes; others are 
currently unable to return although they would eventually like to do so. 
IDPs received almost no aid during the initial years of displacement from the authorities for resettlement 
in other areas in terms of assistance for housing, food, cash, access to education, health care, and 
employment opportunities.121 Therefore, the displaced have often joined the ranks of the urban poor in 
south-eastern cities (such as Diyarbakır, Batman, Hakkâri and Van) as well as western metropolises (such 
as Istanbul and Ankara).122 
Urban IDPs suffer from a host of interrelated problems, including poverty and joblessness; inadequate 
access to education for school-age children; use of child labour as a coping strategy; poor housing; and 
insufficient access to health and psychosocial care.123 Coming from agricultural backgrounds and hence 
lacking skills for urban employment, the majority of displaced adult men and women are unemployed.124 
Household demands on their labour, inability to speak Turkish and cultural barriers often keep displaced 
women away from the labour market. The available types of work for both men (such as construction and 
street vending) and women125 (for example childcare and piecework at home) are sporadic, informal and 
therefore lack social security benefits. Adult unemployment forces displaced families to send their children 
to work, either on the street as peddlers or in sweatshops (such as small, informal garment workshops in 
Istanbul). Having to contribute to household income keeps many children away from school, although 
some of them have been enrolled in the past few years, partly as a result of the conditional cash transfers 
mentioned below. Working on streets and in sweatshops also puts children’s health and safety at risk and 
hampers their physical and psychological development. 
119 See, EC, 2004 “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, (6 November 2004) and 2005 “Regular Report on Turkey’s 
Progress towards Accession”, (9 November 2005), both available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm.
120 Framework Document, Objective 6 and Implementation Principle 7.
121 The only apparent exceptions are the settlement of a limited number of IDPs in the mid-1990s in the Tunceli and Diyarbakır 
provinces in vacant housing built after earthquakes, and the building of some urban housing for IDPs in the provincial centre of 
Van several years after displacement. This information comes from TESEV interviews with IDPs in Istanbul and Diyarbakır as well 
as some newspaper reports. See also, Leyla Şen, “Poverty Alleviation, Conflict and Power in Poor Displaced Households: A Study of 
the Views of Women in Diyarbakır”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 32 (2005): 113-136.    
122 There are a number of studies that emphasise the link between internal displacement in Turkey’s south-east region and growing 
urban poverty. For instance, see: Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yükseker, “A Belated Awakening: National and International Responses 
to the Internal Displacement of Kurds in Turkey”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 32 (2005): 5-42, available from http://home.ku.edu.
tr/~dyukseker/ayata-yukseker-NPT.pdf; Şen, “Poverty Alleviation”; R. Dağ, A. Göktürk and H.C. Türksoy, editors, Bölgeiçi Zorunlu 
Göçten Kaynaklanan Toplumsal Sorunların Diyarbakır Kenti Ölçeğinde Araştırılması (2nd Expanded Edition), Ankara: TMMOB, 
1998; Mehmet Barut, Zorunlu Göçe Maruz Kalan Kürt Kökenli T.C. Vatandaşlarının Göç Öncesi ve Göç Sonrası Sosyo Ekonomik, 
Sosyo Kültürel Durumları, Askeri Çatışma ve Gerginlik Politikaları Sonucu Meydana Gelen Göçün Ortaya Çıkardığı Sorunlar ve Göç 
Mağduru Ailelerin Geriye Dönüş Eğilimlerinin Araştırılması ve Çözüm Önerileri, Göç-Der, Istanbul, 1999-2001; and Bediz Yılmaz, 
“The Dialectics of Exclusion and Integration in the Example of Kurdish Conflict-Induced Migrants in Istanbul”, unpublished paper 
(on file with the TESEV Working Group). 
123 For more information on IDPs’ problems related to health and psychosocial care, see TESEV Report, footnote 2.
124 The majority of male household heads interviewed by TESEV in Istanbul and Diyarbakır were unemployed. Various surveys 
conducted among IDPs in Diyarbakır and other cities reveal adult unemployment ratios between 60 and 80 percent. For instance, 
see Mehmet Barut, Zorunlu Göçe Maruz Kalan Kürt Kökenli T.C. Vatandaşları (op. cit.) for a survey conducted in several provinces 
among IDPs; and R. Dağ, A. Göktürk and H.C. Türksoy, Bölgeiçi Zorunlu Göç (op. cit.) as well as M. Ersoy, and H. T. Şengül (editors), 
Kente Göç ve Yoksulluk: Diyarbakır Örneği (2000, ODTÜ, Ankara) for surveys of IDPs in Diyarbakır.
125 For a study about IDP women’s conditions in Istanbul, see Betül Çelik, “‘I Miss My Village!’: Forced Kurdish Migrants in Istanbul and 
their Representation in Associations”, New Perspectives on Turkey, 32, Spring 2005: 137-163.
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Lack of access to education is a broader problem for IDPs irrespective of child labour. Especially in the early 
years of displacement, many families could not send their children to school due to financial problems. 
Many displaced children grew up without any formal education, and cannot find jobs in the urban labour 
market.  Furthermore, lack of access to education is also a problem for returnees and those considering 
return, as many rural settlements where returns are taking place do not have operating schools (see 
“Return” below.)
Lastly, the trauma of displacement and ensuing poverty in cities has triggered psychological and other health 
problems. Most families the TESEV Working Group visited lived in unhealthy, inadequate, overcrowded and 
small living spaces. These living conditions facilitate the outbreak of disease and make recovery difficult. 
Children suffer from malnutrition. Despite the existence of a free health care programme for the poor (see 
the section below) and also because most urban displaced do not have social security,126 they do not have 
adequate access to public health institutions and services. Furthermore, there are no services specifically 
designed for psychosocial care for displaced women and children. In some women’s and children’s support 
centres in the districts of Istanbul, Batman, Hakkâri and Diyarbakır, where IDPs are concentrated, there was 
awareness of their specific conditions; however there were no particular services designed to help them.
4.4 Government Programmes from which IDPs Benefit 
Despite the lack of specific projects addressing the current conditions of the displaced, many IDPs have 
benefited from a number of nationwide programmes targeting the poorest segments of the Turkish 
population. Chief among these is the “green card” which provides free health care and medication to the 
poor; one time only food, fuel, clothing, stationery and cash grants given by the local chapters of the Social 
Aid and Solidarity Fund; bi-monthly conditional cash transfers to families who keep their children in school 
and have their vaccinations done regularly; and annual direct income support to farmers independent of 
agricultural production. In addition, some social services have become available for IDP children working on 
the streets in Ankara, Istanbul and Diyarbakır in the past few years and their families have been enrolled in 
the above-mentioned conditional cash transfer programme. 
The “green card” may deserve special attention in this context as the farthest-reaching programme among 
IDPs. Currently, more than 3 million people have the “green card” in 14 provinces in the eastern and 
south-eastern regions (those provinces from where displacement originated and where the RVRP is being 
implemented) among a total of 10 million “green card” holders across the nation. Although the number 
of IDPs within these figures is not known, TESEV Working Group’s interviews suggest that access to the 
“green card” is relatively widespread among the displaced.127 In addition, direct income support to farmers 
also deserves some mention because of its reach in the south-east. The number of farmers and the amount 
of money paid to them in the 14 RVRP provinces is in line with the proportion of this region’s population 
to the total population of Turkey.128 The reason why the eastern and south-eastern regions were able to 
benefit relatively well from this programme despite internal displacement must be related to the fact that 
farmers can in practice receive the direct income support even if they have not tilled their agricultural lands 
for many years. 
These are welcome developments, but two serious concerns regarding their implementation vis-à-vis 
the displaced need to be underlined. First of all, these programmes are broad poverty and “social risk” 
alleviation schemes and so may not take account of the special circumstances and needs of IDPs. A second 
concern is that many IDPs are not eligible to receive assistance under these schemes. For instance, one of the 
criteria for determining poverty status is lack of agricultural property; many displaced households own rural 
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126 In Turkey, social security benefits are not universal; one needs to be legally (self-) employed or be the dependent of a legally (self-) 
employed person in order to be covered under a social security programme. Although lack of social security is a broader social 
problem and hence far from being unique to the displaced population, the fact that most adult IDPs are either unemployed or 
sporadically employed in the informal sector has the consequence that most of them do not have social security. 
127 The Ministry of Health does not provide an urban/rural breakdown of green card holders; however, we may conjecture that the 
urban poor are the majority among them since health care facilities are sparse in the countryside. It is noteworthy that nearly 30 
per cent of green card holders in Turkey live in the 14 “RVRP provinces”, whereas these 14 provinces account for only 10.6 per cent 
of Turkey’s overall population according to the 2000 Population Census. These ratios were calculated by the TESEV Working Group 
based on the Health Ministry’s green card statistics (available from http://tdms.saglik.gov.tr/ojspdemos/ykbs/ykbs_ilaktif.jsp) and 
2000 Population Census data (available from http://www.die.gov.tr).  
128 Farmers receiving direct income support in the 14 RVRP provinces constitute 11 per cent of all farmers receiving this support 
in Turkey; and the agricultural area in the RVRP provinces supported through this programme is 14 per cent of all the area 
included in the programme across Turkey. The TESEV Working Group calculated these ratios based on the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
direct income support figures for 2004 (available from http://www.tarim.gov.tr/arayuz/9/icerik.asp?efl=desteklemeler/Tugem_
destekleme/destek.htm&curdir=\desteklemeler\Tugem_destekleme&fl=dgd2004_nisanweb.htm). 
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property which they have not been able to access for nearly a decade, a situation which disqualifies them 
from some of the aid programmes. Additionally, some of these programmes came too late to meet IDPs’ 
urgent needs and are not planned to be extended. For example, the conditional cash transfer for families 
with school children and farm support programmes are part of two World Bank-financed projects which 
started in 2001 and are scheduled to end in 2006 and 2007, respectively.129
Finally, the last few years have seen growing concern among policymakers about the issue of child labour 
among displaced families. A Turkish Parliament Commission report on the problem of “street children” 
enumerated internal migration and unemployment among the causes of the increasing numbers of children 
working and/or living on streets in urban centres including Istanbul, Diyarbakır, Mersin and Adana (all of 
which have significant IDP populations) and recommended that centrally-coordinated policies should be 
developed to keep them off the street.130 A number of children’s centres exist in Istanbul where social 
service workers are aware that a significant portion of the target group is from displaced families; but no 
special programmes exist for IDP children. However, a project launched in Diyarbakır last year with the 
collaboration of public authorities, the municipality and NGOs, and which aims at rehabilitating children 
living and/or working on streets and children with substance abuse problems, might prove to be a model 
in this sphere.131 
Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
The majority of the IDP population in Turkey has been living in urban centres for around ten years. Since 
there are no programmes specifically addressing the current conditions of the displaced, they have had to 
face enormous problems such as endemic unemployment, abuse of child labour, lack of access to education 
and health care services, and almost no psychosocial care for adults and children. The government, UNDP 
and civil society organisations urgently need to cooperate in order to develop projects that specifically 
target the problems of urban IDPs. These projects should on the one hand address children’s education, adult 
literacy and skill training. On the other hand, they should focus on employment creation and preferential 
loans for small business start-ups. Such programmes should target both urban centres in the south-eastern 
region and metropolises in the south and west. 
Regarding psychosocial care for women and children, it may be possible to increase the numbers of 
community, women’s and children’s centres and to work with them to build their capacity to serve the 
particular needs of the displaced. The government, the UN and civil society organisations should collaborate 
in providing training and capacity building to these centres.
129 See, World Bank, “Social Risk Mitigation Project. Project Brief” and “Agricultural Reform Implementation. Project Brief” (both 
available from http://www.worldbank.org.tr).
130 “TBMM Çocukları Sokağa Düşüren Nedenlerle Sokak Çocuklarının Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Tedbirlerin 
Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu”, 2005, available from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/sokak_
cocuklari_kom/ raporlar.htm.
131 Interview with the Mayor of Diyarbakır, February 2005.
28
“OVERCOMING A LEGACY OF MISTRUST: TOWARDS RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE DISPLACED” Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the UN Representative on IDPs 
5. RETURN
5.1 Relevant Recommendations from the Representative 
To the government of Turkey:
(i) Clarity and consultation on the return issue:  in view of the various return initiatives and the 
apparent lack of clarity about how these initiatives relate to one another, at which segments of 
the displaced population they are aimed and the concerns to which these issues give rise, the 
government is strongly encouraged to facilitate broad consultation with the displaced and the NGOs 
and civil society organisations working with them.  Assuming that the Village Return project remains 
the government’s principal vehicle for facilitating large-scale return and resettlement in the south-
east, the government should consider producing a document that clearly outlines the objectives, 
scope and resource implications of the project.  Furthermore, the GAP administration should make 
available, if it has not already done so, the results of the feasibility study undertaken by the Turkish 
Social Sciences Association and facilitate an open discussion with the displaced and NGOs on the 
findings of this study and the steps which should be taken to implement them;
(ii) Ensuring non-discrimination in return:  the government should ensure a non-discriminatory 
approach to return by investigating and preventing situations in which former village guards are 
allegedly given preference in the return process over those persons perceived as linked to the 
PKK.  In order to avoid such problems, or the perception that such practices are taking place, it 
is recommended that local authorities review the need for the displaced to indicate the specific 
reason for their displacement when applying to return or, alternatively, present a single option 
which clearly applies to displacement as a result of both terrorist activities and evacuation by the 
security forces.  The authorities should also investigate allegations concerning the use of forms 
bearing a non-litigation clause.  In this connection, the Representative would appreciate receiving 
information from the government on the outcome of the administrative inspection of the judicial 
system in Diyarbakir which provided a context in which, according to officials in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), this issue might be addressed.
5.2 Government Policy on Return
The most comprehensive step taken by the government to facilitate IDPs’ returns to their original places 
of residence is the RVRP, which was initiated based on a 1998 government circular.132 This project – which 
initially included the 12 provinces of Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkâri, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, 
Şırnak, Tunceli and Van – was later extended to include Adıyaman and Ağrı as well.133 The RVRP consists of 
the following activities in these 14 provinces: resettlement of those who wish to return to their own villages 
or to other available areas; the building of the necessary social and economic infrastructure; facilitating 
sustainable living conditions during resettlement; the rebuilding and revival of the disrupted rural life; 
the development of a more balanced settlement plan in rural areas; a more rational distribution of 
government investments and services; and supporting the development of “central villages”. In 2000, the 
RVRP’s administration passed from the General Directorate of Rural Services to the interior ministry and to 
relevant governorships, for the purpose of enlarging the project’s scope and to facilitate implementation. 
There are two main types of assistance under the RVRP. First, individual IDP households may be provided 
with building materials and some farm animals when they apply to a governorship to return to their village 
(covered under a government-allotted RVRP budget). Secondly, governorships rebuild public infrastructure 
in some resettled villages (covered under individual governorships’ “Special Provincial Administration 
Budget” (İl Özel İdare Bütçesi)).134
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132 Bekir Sıtkı Dağ, Presentation at UNDP Workshop.
133 RVRP was originally introduced in 1994 and covered six provinces. The Project took its current form after the issuance of the 1998 
Government Circular.
134 For instance, the Diyarbakır Governorship built water pumping stations in 37 villages and 23 hamlets where IDP returns took 
place and repaired the roads of some resettled villages as part of its 2005 Special Administration Budget. This was in addition to 
construction materials, farm animals and bee hives given to individual applicants. Phone interview with Diyarbakır Vice Governor, 
27 February 2006. 
According to the interior ministry, approximately one third of the displaced (138,000 persons) had returned 
to their villages under the RVRP as of 31 January 2006.135 The numbers provided by the ministry are criticised 
by national and international NGOs as inaccurate, for two reasons.136 First, considering that many people 
were displaced more than ten years ago, their households have grown in many cases and new households 
have been formed in others. Secondly, many people only return temporarily because either the conditions 
in their villages of origin are not suitable for returning permanently or because they are now settled in 
urban areas, but return to their villages of origin seasonally. For example, many displaced people – in 
particular the elderly – stay in their villages for the planting and harvesting season and then return to the 
cities for the winter, raising the question of what exactly return means.137 
5.3 Clarity and Consultation on Return
The government considers the RVRP to be the main return and resettlement programme, but it has not 
produced a document that clearly outlines the objectives, scope and resource implications of the project. 
The Framework Document is a positive step in the direction of clarifying overall government policy 
on returns. However, it does not clarify how the RVRP has been implemented in the past, nor does it 
specify the particular scope of the project and resource implications. In addition, concrete projects and 
programmes for the socio-economic revival of the rural areas of the affected region are still lacking, 
although the Framework Document addresses the need to formulate policies for social, economic, cultural 
and educational development projects as part of the return process (see “Clarifying and Disseminating the 
National Policy” above).  
The Framework Document commits the government to consultation with NGOs on return.138 Yet, until 
the present, the government has not engaged in any systematic cooperation and consultation with the 
displaced and civil society organisations on this issue. Some officials say that the RVRP is in some ways still at 
the “research” stage and that once it moves to the implementation stage, the government plans to consult 
NGOs.139 However, bearing in mind that the RVRP in its current form has been in effect for nearly a decade, 
this argument is questionable. Consultation with the displaced and civil society is especially important to 
determine IDPs’ expectations and needs during the return process as well as for the purpose of providing a 
more secure environment for the returnees. 
5.4 Obstacles to Return 
Several factors continue to pose obstacles to return in the areas where original displacement took place, 
including real or perceived security threats to IDPs, landmines and UXO, paucity of aid for returnees, and 
lack of public and social services in the return areas. The relative importance of these obstacles changes 
from one place to another.  
Security forces do not hinder IDPs from returning on the grounds of lack of safety in most areas about which 
the TESEV Working Group has gathered information, with the notable exception of Hakkâri. For instance, 
it is generally safe for IDPs to return to their villages in Batman and Diyarbakır provinces, except several 
hamlets of a particular village in the Kulp District of Diyarbakır. In Kulp, security forces are reported to have 
warned villagers wanting to return to those hamlets that there was a safety problem.140 While conducting 
the Hacettepe Survey, the HIPS team was unable to reach only two villages (in Bingöl and Ağrı) for security 
reasons out of the many villages in the sample they have drawn from the 14 provinces where original 
displacement took place.141 But in Hakkâri, security conditions have posed and continue to pose an obstacle 
to return. A limited process of return has only started in this province within the past few years and these 
135 MOI presentation at UNDP Workshop.
136 For instance, HRW’s 2005 report documented that there were far fewer returnees in many villages than the figures disclosed by 
the ministry. See, HRW, “‘Still critical’: Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced Kurds in Turkey”, 2005, available from http://www.
hrw.org/reports/2005/turkey0305/index.htm. Likewise, HRA shared with the TESEV Working Group figures pertaining to selected 
villages in the region in which the numbers of returnees were clearly below the numbers provided by the ministry. Informal 
communication with HRA’s Diyarbakır Branch, May 2005.
137 For a critical discussion of what “return” means for different people, see Ayata and Yükseker, “Belated Awakening”, pages 35-36. 
138 Framework Document, Implementation Principle 10.
139 Interview with government officials, 14 February 2006, Ankara.
140 Phone interviews with Mahsuni Karaman, Migration Coordinator for the Diyarbakır Bar Association, 25 February 2006, and Ahmet 
Kalpak, Director of Göç-Der’s Diyarbakır Branch, 27 February 2006.
141 Sinan Türkyılmaz, HIPS Presentation at UNDP Workshop.
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returns have been seasonal for the most part, with IDPs returning for the summer to harvest their fields.142 
However, an escalation in fighting accompanied by the burning of IDP tents last summer compelled these 
temporary returnees to once again leave their villages.143 There are some villages in Hakkâri, particularly 
in the Çukurca district along the border with Iraq, where security officials do not allow IDP returns on 
the basis of lack of security.144 Security risks include the presence of landmines and unexploded shells (see 
“Mine Clearance” above) as well as military operations against the PKK or the presence of PKK militants in 
a particular area. 
Although security forces do not prevent IDPs from returning on safety grounds in most areas, many IDPs 
cite lack of security as one of the key reasons why they are currently unable to return. It should be borne 
in mind that although armed clashes between the PKK and the Turkish security forces had almost ceased 
in 1999, armed activity has escalated in the region since 2004, especially in the spring and summer months. 
Security forces have been conducting operations against PKK hideouts and against PKK infiltration across 
borders, while the PKK has mined roads and planted bombs. Both sides’ actions have resulted in casualties 
among the military, civilians and PKK militants.145 Almost all persons interviewed by the TESEV Working 
Group in the four provincial centres and in some districts of Batman and Hakkâri said that they could not 
consider returning to their original areas before security and peace were guaranteed. They feared being 
compelled to flee again due to military operations, armed clashes, assaults by PKK militants, or pressure 
from the state to become village guards. Urban IDPs are not the only ones to harbour fears for their security 
if they returned. TESEV Working Group interviews with returnees in several villages in Batman where the 
return process has gradually started said that they wanted to stay in their villages, but that they feared 
having to leave again if armed clashes flared up. 
In addition, there are obstacles to return that stem from problems in the implementation of the RVRP, paucity 
of aid and lack of socio-economic infrastructure. The implementation of the RVRP has not been sufficiently 
transparent, and the authority to allocate payments rests with the governorships (valilik) and sub-provincial 
governorships (kaymakamlık) which have created inconsistencies in the allocation of financial assistance for 
returns in the different provinces. IDPs consider RVRP aid (often in the form of construction materials) to be 
insufficient for rebuilding a house, covering the costs of moving back and starting agricultural activities.146 
They also emphasise that there are often no public services (piped water, electricity, paved roads, etc) or 
social services (schools, healthcare) in their villages of origin. The lack of public infrastructure has been a 
considerable barrier to sustainable return. It should however be emphasised that in some provinces, IDPs’ 
expectations in terms of public amenities may have grown during the many years since they were displaced, 
making it unattractive especially for younger people and adult women to return to a barren rural life.147 
It should also be noted that in some provinces, for instance Diyarbakır, public authorities have made some 
investments in rebuilding the infrastructure of returnee villages.148
In several south-eastern provinces, some families have been resettled in places other than their own villages 
or hamlets, usually in housing projects in central villages. Some IDPs claimed that the governorships of Tunceli 
and Van proposed that their families settle in places other than their original places of residence through 
the RVRP, but that they lost the opportunity to benefit from the RVRP when they refused this offer.149 Given 
the social and cultural structure in the region and animosities between groups which emerged in the course 
of the armed conflict, many families may not want to live in centralised settlements.150 Therefore, it must be 
ensured that returns are voluntary and that assistance is not made contingent on certain conditions. 
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142 Interview with a public official in Hakkâri, 19 October 2005. NGOs and municipality officers report that IDPs return to their villages 
only during summer and live in tents, October 2005. 
143 Interview with Deputy Mayor, Hakkâri, 10 October 2005. The Deputy Mayor said that the burning of tents was concentrated in 
the villages of the Çukurca district. The HRA also stated that the seasonal returnees in Çukurca, whose harvest was burnt, suffered 
considerably in 2005. Interview with Necibe Güneş, HRA Hakkâri, 19 October 2005.    
144 An IDP told the TESEV Working Group that IDPs who attempted to return to the Işıklı village of Çukurca were not granted access. 
Interview with IDPs in Çukurca, 21 October 2005.
145 For instance, HRA’s annual reports indicate a noticeable increase in the number of people killed in armed clashes in 2004 (240 
killed) and 2005 (496 killed) up from 104 in 2003, 30 in 2002 and 92 in 2001. 857 people were killed in clashes in 2000. The report 
does not give a breakdown of where these clashes took place. See HRA Report-2005, footnote 77.
146 Interviews with IDPs in Diyarbakır and Istanbul in February and July 2005, respectively.
147 For an elaboration of the different expectations of IDPs regarding return based on gender and generation, see TESEV Report, 
pages 8-13.
148 Phone interview with Diyarbakır’s Vice-Governor, 27 February 2006.
149 Interviews with two IDPs from Tunceli and Van in Istanbul, July 2005.
150 HRW has also argued that IDPs do not wish to be resettled in central villages, citing testimony by IDPs in Van’s Konalga village. 
See HRW, “Displaced and Disregarded: Turkey’s Failing Village Return Programme”, vol. 14, no. 7 (October 2002), available from 
http://hrw.org/reports/2002/turkey/Turkey1002.pdf. Interestingly, the sub-regional development plans commissioned by the GAP 
Authority also mention that the overwhelming majority of surveyed IDPs would not want to be resettled in centralised villages 
because of cultural reasons, tribal rifts and their preference for living close to their agricultural property. For instance, see Türk 
Sosyal Bilimler Derneği, “Diyarbakır İli Yeniköy Merkez Köyü ve Alt Bölge Planı” in Doğu ve Güneydoğu Bölgesi Köye Dönüş ve 
Rehabilitasyon Projesi Alt Bölge Gelişme Planları, 2002, Ankara: GAP, p.11.
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5.5 Ensuring Non-discrimination in Return
Some IDPs say that in the early 2000s village guards were prioritised in the return process and in the 
allocation of government aid and investments targeting returnees.151 But there have been no recent reports 
about priority treatment being given to village guards in the return process.152 Nevertheless, there may be 
other types of discrimination in allocating RVRP aid since eligibility criteria are not transparent.153  
In earlier stages of the return process, there were reports that IDPs who wished to return in the framework 
of the RVRP had to sign forms on which they had to tick an option saying that they had left their home 
because of the PKK. This is no longer practiced. 
Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
Security forces no longer hinder returns on the grounds of lack of safety in most areas where original 
displacement took place, with the notable exception of Hakkâri. However, given that armed activity by the 
PKK as well as military operations by the Turkish armed forces have increased in the past two years, actual 
or perceived security threats continue to prevent many IDPs from considering return to their original homes 
and lead returnees to consider leaving their villages again. The government should take further measures 
to protect the safety of the returnee population in order to prevent a new wave of displacement. Local 
NGOs and public authorities in the region should cooperate in building trust between IDPs and the state in 
order to remove perceptions of lack of safety in places where this is not the case.
Other obstacles to return are the paucity of aid under the RVRP, lack of infrastructure and public services in 
the rural areas from which original displacement took place and resistance against centralised settlements. 
The government should clarify its implementation of the RVRP in line with the Framework Document, and 
in consultation with NGOs. A focal point should be created in the interior ministry to work systematically 
with NGOs on the issue of returns. Concrete steps should be taken to rebuild the rural economy and public 
infrastructure so that returns may become sustainable. 
6. PROPERTY
6.1 Relevant Recommendations from the Representative 
To the government of Turkey:
Compensation:  the Representative welcomes the steps that are being taken within the government 
to develop legislation providing compensation to those affected by the violence in the south-east, 
including those who were evacuated from their homes by the security forces.  While aware of the 
fiscal pressures under which the government is currently operating, the Representative encourages 
the early submission of this legislation to Parliament and in the meantime urges the government to 
begin considering the modalities of establishing a system for the efficient handling of claims that 
will arise under the proposed legislation.
151 For instance, the TESEV Working Group has heard that evacuated village guards were given priority in the provision of housing 
in a government-built project in Van (Yalım Erez Mahallesi). Similarly, some IDPs in Diyarbakır considered investments in housing 
in a particular central village to have given priority to village guards. Interviews with IDPs in Diyarbakır and Istanbul, February 
2005 and July 2005, respectively. Some IDPs interviewed by TESEV in Batman also claimed that village guards were given priority 
in access to aid under the RVRP, June 2005. 
152 Phone interviews with Mahsuni Karaman of Diyarbakır Bar Association, 25 February 2005, and with Ahmet Kalpak of Diyarbakır 
Göç-Der, 27 February 2006. According to the Diyarbakır Governorship’s figures, 19,800 of the originally evicted 43,664 people have 
returned. Phone interview with Diyarbakır’s Vice-Governor, 27 February 2006. 
153 In a village of Batman whose evicted Yezidi population had sought asylum in Germany, a returnee told the TESEV Working Group 
that he believed that the rejection of his application to the RVRP stemmed from the misguided belief that he must be wealthy 
since he had lived in Germany. Interview on 30 June 2005. 
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6.2 Compensation Law
The enactment of the Compensation Law in 2004 is without doubt the most significant step taken to date 
towards addressing the problem of internal displacement in Turkey. In adopting this law, the government 
took an important step towards fulfilling the RSG’s recommendation, which was also reiterated by the EU 
in its annual Progress Reports.154 The government’s Framework Document identifies the enactment of the 
Compensation Law as “a major step … towards the elimination of the difficulties faced by [IDPs]”, and sets 
as its objective “ensuring effective implementation” of the law.155  
6.2.1 The Procedure and Substance of the Compensation Law
The Compensation Law was enacted on 17 July 2004 and entered into force on 27 July 2004.156 The 
implementing regulation was issued by the Council of Ministers on 4 October 2004,157 and amended on 15 
September 2005.158 Initially, the duration for applications for losses suffered prior to the date of enactment 
was limited to one year; but this deadline was extended to the beginning of 2007 under a recent amendment 
to the Compensation Law.159 
The law aims to indemnify persons for material damages since 1987 “arising from acts of terror or from 
measures taken to fight against terror”, and provides compensation to anyone who has sustained losses 
due to terrorism or anti-terror activities, including (but not limited to) IDPs, members of the armed forces, 
the police and the village guards.160 It provides reparation for three kinds of losses: damage to moveable or 
immoveable property, damage to the life and body of the person, and damage sustained due to inability to 
access one’s property.161 The task of processing the petitions, evaluating the incurred losses, and specifying 
the amount of compensation is conferred on damage assessment commissions,162 established in provinces 
on demand.163 These commissions are composed of seven members, six of whom are public employees. 
The chairman is a deputy governor designated by the governor. The remaining members are five public 
employees appointed by the governor from the departments of finance, public works and housing, 
agriculture and rural affairs, health, and industry and commerce; and a lawyer appointed by the relevant 
bar association. The lawyer is the only non-governmental member of the commissions.164 
Upon assessing the damage sustained by the applicants, the commissions prepare declarations of friendly-
settlement (sulhname), which specify the compensation to be paid in cash or in kind, and present it to the 
applicant.165 Any prior payment made to the applicant by the state is deducted from that amount.166 Should 
the applicant disagree with the terms of the declaration and refuse to sign it, a protocol of non-agreement 
is signed,167 after which time the applicant retains the right to bring an action for compensation in the 
relevant administrative court.168 
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154 EC, 2004 “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress  towards Accession”, (6 November 2004) and 2005 “Regular Report on Turkey’s 
Progress towards Accession”, (9 November 2005), both available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm
155 Framework Document, Objective 7.
156 Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanun [Law on Compensation for Losses Resulting from 
Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism], no. 5233, 17 July 2004, (hereafter “Compensation Law”), Resmi Gazete, no. 25535, 27 
July 2004, available from http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr/.
157 Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Yönetmelik [Implementing Regulation on Compensation 
for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight Against Terrorism], Decision no. 2004/7955, 4 October 2004, Resmi Gazete, no. 
25619, 20 October 2004, available from http://rega.basbakanlik.gov.tr. 
158 Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik 
[Implementing Regulation on the Amendment of the Implementing Regulation on Compensation for Losses Resulting from 
Terrorism and the Fight Against Terrorism], Decision No: 2005/9329, 22 August 2005, Resmi Gazete, no. 25937, 15 September 
2005. 
159 This amendment was passed by the parliament on 28 December 2005 and came into effect on 3 January 2006. Terör ve Terörle 
Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun [Law on the Amendment 
of Law on Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism], no. 5442, 28 December 2005, 
(Hereafter Law no. 5442), Resmi Gazete, no. 26042, 3 January 2006. 
160 Compensation Law, article 1. 
161 Ibid, article 7 reads: “The damage to be compensated by this Law, through friendly settlement, is as follows: a) All types of damage 
caused to livestock, trees, agricultural products and any moveable or immoveable property; b) Damage resulting from injury, 
physical disability and death and expenditure incurred for medical treatment and funeral expenses; and c) Material damage 
suffered by those who could not gain access to their property because of the acts carried out within the context of the fight 
against terrorism”. 
162 Ibid, article 5. 
163 Ibid, article 4. 
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid, article 5(b).
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid, article 5(c).
168 Ibid, article 12.  
As of 31 January 2006, a total of nearly 180,000 applications had been made to the 92 commissions 
established in 79 provinces.169 Of these applications, some 16,000 (less than 10%) had been concluded; 
6,000 applications resulted in positive decisions for the payment of compensation, 10,000 were rejected.170 
An interior ministry official explained that more than 5,000 of the rejections were on the grounds that the 
applicants were security personnel who had received compensation earlier.171 He did not indicate the reason 
for the rejection of the remaining 4,000. An official document TESEV obtained, which provides information 
on nationwide implementation of the law, includes a breakdown of the grounds for rejections.172 As of the 
end of 2005, 8,826 out of 177,416 applications were rejected for the following reasons: 1,650 for falling 
outside the substantive scope of the law; 5,144 for having received compensation earlier; 474 for falling 
outside the time period covered by the law; 634 for lack of proper information and documents; and 924 
for “other” reasons. Among these, the ground of “lack of information and documents” is of particular 
concern. This issue is discussed in detail below (see “Evidentiary Matters: High Rates of Rejection Arising 
from Undue Burden of Proof”).
6.2.2 Shortcomings in the Substance of the Law
The scope of the Compensation Law as defined in Article 1 is positive in that it indemnifies damages, 
regardless of who has caused them.173 Thus, the law encompasses victims who were forced to leave or flee 
their homes, either by the PKK for having become village guards; or by the security forces for refusing to 
become village guards or for allegedly aiding the PKK. However, the limitation of the scope of the law to 
people who were forcibly evicted goes against the Guiding Principles’ broader description of IDPs which 
also includes people who are “obliged” to flee due to the consequences of armed conflict, situations of 
generalised violence and human rights violations.174 The limitation in Article 1 of the law to losses “arising 
from acts of terror or from measures taken to fight against terror” risks excluding in practice IDPs who 
were not directly evicted by the PKK or the security forces but who were obliged to flee due to the effects 
of the conflict in the area. The wide administrative discretion afforded in the application of this provision 
may lead to narrow interpretations by some commissions. Indeed, a deputy governor in Hakkâri said that 
the applications of individuals who claim to have been obliged to flee due to security concerns are being 
rejected because “this law does not allow the assessment of such claims”.175 While commissions in other 
provinces, such as Diyarbakır, have so far been flexible in the implementation of this provision,176 the case of 
Hakkâri points out to the need to limit the margin of administrative discretion by a legislative amendment, 
which would explicitly state that losses “suffered due to the armed conflict” are also covered.  
Similarly, the law’s temporal scope is problematic: initiating the law’s coverage from 1987 – the year the 
state of emergency was declared – results in the non-compensation of losses sustained between 1984, the 
year when the PKK launched its armed struggle, and 1987. The statement in the Framework Document that 
“[n]umerous villages were deserted in Turkey between 1984 and 1998” also indicates this weakness in the 
law.177 Upon having this discrepancy pointed out, an interior ministry official explained that the rationale 
behind having 1987 as the cut-off date was to provide a remedy to those who could not bring a claim in 
the courts during the state of emergency, when government policies were exempt from judicial review.178 
While he acknowledged that the clashes started in 1984, he argued that people who have suffered losses 
then had the chance to bring an action in courts. However, for many people it was not practically possible 
to sue the state between 1984 and 1987, during which time there was martial law in the region.179 
169 Bekir Sıtkı Dağ, Presentation at the UNDP Workshop.
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid.
172 Interior ministry document showing the nationwide results of applications under the Compensation Law (Hereinafter “MOI 
Document). On file with the TESEV Working Group.
173 Compensation Law, article 1.
174 Article 2 of the Guiding Principles defines IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to 
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, 
situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognised State border”.  
175 Interview with a deputy governor in Hakkâri, 19 October 2005. 
176 Interview with a lawyer in Diyarbakır, 14 March 2006.
177 Framework Document, line 1. 
178 MOI official, responding to questions, UNDP Workshop.
179 Indeed, lawyers point out that the legal process was actually much more inaccessible during martial law, when both the political 
and judicial processes were under the control of the army. They point out the contrast between the constitutionality of the state 
of emergency with the extra-legality of martial law. Interview with Tahir Elçi, Istanbul, 12 March 2006.
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6.2.3 Dissemination of Information about the Law
The government has not adequately disseminated information on the law. Rather, a group of NGOs, 
including HRA and Göç-Der, and local bar associations took the initiative to disseminate information and to 
raise awareness. Notwithstanding, there is an uncertainty as to the depth of awareness among IDPs about 
the law. It is uncertain whether and how much IDPs know about their rights and how to apply to the law. 
While most IDPs interviewed by the TESEV Working Group had heard about the law and had applications 
pending before the commissions, almost all of them lacked meaningful information about these issues and 
many confused their applications under the law with those under the RVRP or the claims they had brought 
to courts immediately following their displacement in the 1990s. 
IDPs also have an insufficient understanding of the scope of the law. Many believe that the Compensation 
Law only covers losses resulting from evictions and not death and injury.180 In another case, a man whose 
village was burnt down by security forces said that he was not intending to apply since he had not suffered 
personal injury.181 The law’s title has also been a source of confusion. Intimidated by the word “terror”, 
individuals may fear that they would be considered a terrorist if they filed a petition.182 A lawyer in the 
region said that victims perceive making an application under the law not as a legitimate claim of their 
rights, but as lodging a complaint against the state.183 
The government’s failure to adequately disseminate information about the Compensation Law may also 
serve to feed the widespread feelings of mistrust towards the state. Many NGOs and attorneys perceive the 
law as intended to appease the EU and the ECtHR. Others harbour mistrust towards the state and doubt 
that it would act in good faith. The government’s initiation of a public awareness campaign about the 
Compensation Law might help eradicate that mistrust. 
6.2.4 The Special Responsibility of NGOs and Lawyers in Establishing Trust
NGOs and lawyers play a critical role in the effective implementation of the law but in certain cases, they 
have also undermined the process. A complaint expressed by many public officials is that IDPs have abused 
the law by exaggerating their losses and/or filing applications for losses incurred by their parents when 
they were minors, in other words claiming compensation when they lack the grounds. While such incidents 
verified by lawyers are insignificant in number, they are nonetheless causes for concern in that they serve 
to feed the existing environment of mutual mistrust between the state and the IDPs. Within this context, 
lawyers have a special responsibility to advise their clients to be truthful in their claims.184 Another issue is 
the poor quality of legal services available to IDPs, which is partly related to the perception by some lawyers 
of the Compensation Law as a revenue-generating source. In Batman, two NGOs’ monopoly-like dominance 
over the representation of IDPs raises concern not only from the perspective of professional ethics, but also 
in terms of its impact on the quality of legal services. Some lawyers working with these NGOs have up to 600 
files in their hands, and it is virtually impossible for them to be able to represent the best interests of each 
of their clients.185 Submitting petitions that do not sufficiently reflect the subjective case of each applicant 
may result in the awarding of low amounts of compensation. 
There is also concern about lawyers’ abiding by their ethical responsibilities towards their clients. For some 
lawyers, settling with the government and thus receiving from their clients a pre-agreed commission within 
a matter of few years may be preferable over a long, difficult and unpredictable legal process. However, 
some IDPs, albeit in small numbers, prefer to bring their claims to administrative courts and later to the 
ECtHR with the hope of getting compensation for pain and suffering or winning a judgment against the 
state. Other lawyers may take an ideological stand and advise their clients not to settle with the commissions 
Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations made by the UN Representative on IDPs 
35
180 Interview with a former headman (muhtar) of two IDP-populated neighbourhoods in Batman. 
181 Interview with returnees in a village of Batman, June 2005. 
182 An interviewed IDP in Batman said he would not claim compensation for the death of his father for fear of reprisal, June 2005. 
183 Interview with Bengi Yıldız, Batman, 29 June 2005. 
184 Indeed, many lawyers interviewed in Batman and Hakkâri were cognizant of their ethical responsibility and have been instrumental 
in correcting the misrepresentations made by their clients. NGOs have also played an important role in advising IDPs to be 
truthful. 
185 Interview with Mazlum-Der, Batman, 24 June 2006. Some lawyers in Diyarbakır also conceded privately that some of their 
colleagues considered applications to this law to be a source of revenue and so they were not protecting the best interests of their 
clients. Anonymous interview in Diyarbakır, February 2006.
in order to bring an action against the state.186 Yet some others may engage in clientelist relationships with 
the commissions in order to expedite the processing of their applications.187 These examples are grounds for 
concern in that they may serve to exacerbate the feelings of mutual distrust between the state and the IDPs.
6.2.5  The Types and Amounts of Damages 
A uniform view shared by virtually all lawyers and NGOs the TESEV Working Group interviewed is that 
the non-provision of damages for pain and suffering is a fundamental shortcoming of the Compensation 
Law. In having paid compensation for pain and suffering to several IDPs who have won a case188 or friendly 
settlement189 at the ECtHR but not granting the same right to those who apply to the Compensation Law, 
the state effectively discriminates between IDPs who have experienced similar grievances. The lawyers and 
NGOs the TESEV Working Group interviewed emphasised that the payment of compensation for pain and 
suffering has great significance in encouraging victims’ belief in justice and in achieving social reconciliation 
(see “Reconciliation” below). It would also serve to compensate losses suffered by a significant number 
of IDPs who did not own land, but were uprooted from the lands they cultivated and used. In a similar 
manner, non-pecuniary damages could, to a certain extent, remedy grievances in cases where rights over 
the land cannot be proven. 
The law provides an extremely low amount of damages for death and bodily harm. All attorneys and victims, 
and some public officials interviewed stated that the 14,000 NTL ($10,350)190 paid for death “cannot be the 
value of a human life”.191 Lawyers also point out that a predetermined, fixed amount of compensation 
for death and bodily harm contradicts the general principles of the law of damages in Turkey.192 Pursuant 
to these principles, it is common practice for the courts to take into account the subjective conditions 
of the deceased or injured person, such as his/her age, income, and education level, in determining the 
compensation amount to be paid to such person or his/her legal heirs.  
6.2.6  Problems in Implementation
Based on the TESEV Working Group’s fieldwork, problems related to implementation have three 
fundamental causes: 1) Some commissions are well-meaning and hard-working, but have their hands tied 
due to the shortcomings in the law and the lack of requisite financial and human resources. 2) Others 
may have good intentions, but wait for clear political instructions from the government to improve and 
expedite the process. 3) Others are prejudiced against victims whom they perceive as opportunists who 
want to abuse the law and/or are PKK collaborators. 
The main factor explaining the discrepancy in the attitudes of the commissions and the lack of uniformity 
in their practice is the absence of a clear government directive on the implementation of the Compensation 
Law. In summer 2005, the foreign ministry asked the interior ministry and the Ministry of Justice in a circular 
to expedite the assessment of the applications, to be flexible in evidentiary issues and to be generous in 
186 A lawyer in Hakkâri said he would bypass the commissions and the administrative courts and directly apply to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR). Interview in Hakkâri on 21 October 2005. Such a legal strategy not only entails a very high risk in light 
of the ECtHR’s rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, but also raises ethical issues in view of lawyers’ duty to represent the best 
interests of their clients. The ECtHR eventually ruled in the case of Içyer v. Turkey that the compensation commissions provide 
an effective legal remedy which the applicants must exhaust before filing an action in Strasbourg. ECtHR, İçyer v. Turkey (2006) 
Application No: 18888/02, 12 January.   
187 Declaration announcing the conclusions reached by around 50 lawyers at a meeting at the Diyarbakır Bar Association, 2 February 
2006 (hereafter the “Lawyers’ Declaration”). On file with the TESEV Working Group.
188 In a case where the ECtHR found that “the security forces deliberately destroyed the applicant’s family home and possessions, 
obliging his family to leave their village”, (para. 194) which “constituted serious violations of Article 13 of the Convention 
[protecting the right to an effective remedy before a national authority] and Article 1 of Protocol No.1 [protecting the right to 
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions]” (para. 239) and where it found that the “unacknowledged and presumed death of the 
applicants’ sons in the hands of the security forces” (para. 237) following their “unacknowledged detention by the security forces” 
(para. 168) violated Articles 2 [protecting the right to life], 5 [protecting the right to liberty and security of the person] and 13 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (paras. 168, 191 and 201), the Court awarded non-pecuniary damages to the applicants 
“for the distress and anguish” they suffered on account of these violations. The ECtHR similarly awarded compensation for non-
percuniary harm in other cases such as ECtHR, Case of Hasan İlhan v. Turkey (2005) Application No: 22494/93, 9 November; ECtHR, 
Case of Menteşe and Others v. Turkey (2005) Application No: 36217/97, 18 January.  
189 See e.g. ECtHR, Case of Kemal Güven v. Turkey (2001) Application No: 31847/96, 25 May; ECtHR, Case of Cemal and Nurhayat Güven 
v. Turkey (2001) Application No: 31848/96, 22 May; ECtHR, Case of Aygördü and Others v. Turkey (2001) Application No: 33323/96, 
22 May; ECtHR, Case of İnce and Others v. Turkey (2001) Application No: 33325/96, 22 May.
190 This amount will slightly increase to 16,000  YTL ($11,800) in proportion to the increase in a multiplier based on the salaries of 
public servants in 2006. Phone interview with Mahsuni Karaman, Migration Coordinator of Diyarbakır Bar Association, 25 February 
2006. 
191 Interview with a deputy governor in Batman, 23 June 2005. 
192 Lawyers in Batman and Diyarbakır said that it was against the principles of equity to pay the same amount of damages for the 
death of a 17-year-old and a 60-year-old, or for the death of a small-holding farmer and a big landlord. Interviews in Batman, June 
2005, and in Diyarbakır, February 2006. 
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awarding damages, warning that around 1,500 cases of evictions were pending in the ECtHR.193 Seemingly 
in response to that, the interior ministry sent circulars to the commissions instructing them along the 
same lines and urging them to issue settlements that the government could present as a precedent to the 
ECtHR.194 Based on the sample decisions presented by the government, the ECtHR eventually ruled in its 
İçyer judgment that the commissions provide an “effective remedy” which the IDPs must exhaust before 
applying to Strasbourg.195 Pointing out that these sample decisions were issued under political pressure 
and that such pressure has ceased after İçyer,196 lawyers state with great concern that implementation has 
already slowed down and deteriorated,197 and that the compensation amounts noticeably dropped.198 
     
While it is positive that the Framework Document sets the “effective implementation” of the law as 
a clear government objective, experience so far calls for caution. It is imperative that the government 
develop a clear and binding political position on the law; create guidelines for the commissions on how to 
implement the law in order to guarantee uniformity in implementation; and, in cooperation with national 
and international NGOs, provide training not just to governors and deputy governors, but to all members 
of the commissions. These measures are particularly necessary in the aftermath of the ECtHR’s İçyer ruling, 
which seems already to be causing the commissions to be “more lax” in their work.199 
6.2.7  Evidentiary Matters: High Rates of Rejection Arising from Undue Burden of  
 Proof
The biggest source of problems in implementation relates to the evidentiary burden of proof requirement. 
The impossibility of documenting evictions, most of which were undertaken by security forces, has so far 
resulted in a mixed record in implementation. What lies at the core of the problem is the national authorities’ 
continuing reluctance to take responsibility for evictions by security forces in Turkey,200 although this was 
settled long ago in the Parliamentary Report.201 It has also been pointed out in the recommendation of 
the RSG, who in 2002 welcomed the drafting of a law to compensate IDPs, “including those who were 
evacuated from their homes by the security forces”. This stance critically influences applications where IDPs 
claim that they were evicted by the jandarma. The practice so far in such cases shows that the commissions 
follow one of the two routes: they ask IDPs to produce a document issued by the jandarma showing that 
the latter had indeed evicted the villagers, or they conduct on-site investigations and/or accept as evidence 
the testimony of credible witnesses. The decision over which route to follow can determine the outcome of 
the case. While the undertaking of fact-finding missions in Diyarbakır has resulted in positive decisions,202 
the acceptance of the information provided by the jandarma as binding evidence has led to rejections in 
Hakkâri (see below).      
A vital and welcome recent amendment to the regulation203 now allows IDPs to prove their losses by means 
of any kind of information or document available to them, yet this change seems to have had little impact 
on the practice of some commissions. The commissions in Diyarbakır and Batman have not strictly applied 
formal evidentiary rules even under the former regulation. As a result, not a single rejection has been issued 
in these provinces on the ground of insufficient proof of losses.204 In contrast, the commissions in Şırnak, 
Mardin and Hakkâri continued to impose on IDPs a high burden of proof even after the amendment.205 
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193 “İstediği Tazminatı Alamayan AİHM’e Başvuruyor”, Akşam, 4 August 2005. At the time, the ECtHR was closely following the 
implementation of the Compensation Law before ruling on the mounting cases pending before it.    
194 The TESEV Working Group has been told this open secret by various lawyers, most recently by a member of Batman Bar Association 
(phone interview on 15 February 2006) and a member of the Diyarbakır Bar Association (written communication on 14 March 
2006).
195 See footnote 186.
196 A member of Batman Bar Association stated that the government’s hitherto regular communications to the commissions have 
ceased after the İçyer judgment. Phone interview, 15 February 2006. 
197 Two members of the Diyarbakır Bar Association, one of whom is a member of one of the compensation commissions, stated that 
the hitherto exemplary work done by the commissions in Diyarvakır had recently been deteriorating as a result of the ECtHR’s 
judgment. Written communication on 14 March 2006.
198 Diyarbakır Bar Association’s Migration Coordinator Mahsuni Karaman gave the following examples of the drop in compensation 
amounts awarded in comparable cases in Diyarbakır: in the case of a quarter of an acre of land, from 85 YTL to 50 YTL ($63 to $37); 
and in the case of a walnut tree from 35 YTL to 20 YTL ($26 to $15). Phone interview, 25 February 2006. 
199 Lawyers’ Declaration. 
200 The governors and deputy governors the TESEV Working Group interviewed in Batman and Hakkâri were adamant in emphasising 
that security forces did not “evict” inhabitants from their villages, but that these villages were “deserted”. A similar correction was 
made by an interior ministry official during a phone interview, 10 February 2006.
201 See footnote 9. 
202 For example, the commissions awarded compensation to IDPs in the Şaklat and Narlıca villages of Lice and Kulp districts, 
respectively.
203 See footnote 158.  
204 MOI Document. See footnote 172. 
205 Phone interview with a lawyer in Diyarbakır Bar Association, October 2005. 
The latter approach has led to a high number of rejections due to lack of proper documents. In Hakkâri, 
as of 31 January 2006, out of a total of 1,325 applications, 844 had been rejected. While most of these 
rejected petitions were applications by security personnel who had received compensation earlier,206 309 
were rejected on the grounds of “lack of information and documents”.207 Upon request for specification 
regarding the latter type of rejections, the Hakkâri Governorship stated that these generally relate “to the 
lack of a fact-finding report [by the jandarma] and the absence of such information in the communications 
received from the relevant military [authority], police [authority] and prosecutor’s office”.208 In other words, 
more than one in every four application has been rejected because IDPs could not provide official documents 
to prove either that they had been evicted from their villages by security forces or that they were obliged 
to flee for fear of their personal security. The deputy governor justified the rejection of the latter kind of 
claims on the grounds that there cannot possibly be any document to prove “security concerns”.209 As for 
the former, his answer was straightforward: no one has been evicted from his/her village by the security 
forces.210 He categorically ruled out allowing IDPs to prove their claims by introducing credible witnesses.211 
The different standards of implementation show how administrative discretion can lead to inconsistent 
implementation between provinces. 
Undoubtedly, the government has a legitimate interest in preventing the abuse of the law. However, this 
can be achieved without putting a heavy burden on the IDPs. Requiring victims to provide documents that 
do not exist or are impossible to obtain – such as an admission of guilt by the jandarma – makes the law 
practically inaccessible for some victims. As long as this practice continues, the government cannot claim to 
have fulfilled the RSG’s recommendation to provide compensation to “those who were evicted from their 
homes by the security forces”. In this regard, the above-recommended provision of instructive guidelines 
and training to the commissions becomes all the more critical. 
6.2.8 Evaluation of Eviction Claims: Jandarma as a Source of Information
The evidentiary weight attributed by the commissions to the information provided by the jandarma is 
critical, particularly with respect to claims of damage to immovable property, since it has so far caused a 
discrepancy between various provinces. The determining factor in this respect is whether the commissions 
consider the jandarma’s official information conclusive in processing the applications.  In Diyarbakır, while 
the commissions may receive information from the jandarma, the ultimate evidentiary weight is given to 
the outcome of on-site fact-finding missions.212 In Hakkâri, on the other hand, the jandarma’s opinion can 
determine the outcome of applications.213  
A striking example from Hakkâri testifies to the dangers of relying on information provided by the 
jandarma. On 7 March 2005, one of the commissions rejected the application of an IDP who claimed to 
have incurred losses to his property when he was evicted from his village by security forces in 1996 and 
from his inability to access his property ever since.214 The commission based its decision on the information 
provided by the jandarma that villagers had been residing in the Tümsek hamlet of Otluca village since 
1987, that the hamlet was still accessible and that the applicant had voluntarily left the hamlet in 1997.215 
Two members of the commission, including the lawyer, dissented. What is striking about this decision is 
that it contradicts a previous final court order, which held that the inhabitants of the Otluca village had 
indeed been evicted by the Hakkâri Mountain and Commando Brigade on 24 August 1996 and that access 
to the village had thereupon been subject to special permission.216 In asking for information from the 
jandarma, the alleged perpetrator of the events, instead of admitting as evidence a court decision on file, 
206 Compensation Law, article (II)(A)(2)(a) (excluding from the scope of the law losses for which compensation has previously been 
paid through other legal means).
207 Written information received from the Hakkâri Governorship, 10 February 2006.
208 Ibid.
209 Interview with a deputy governor in Hakkâri, 19 October 2005. 
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid. However, in a welcome development, the commissions in Hakkâri seem to have changed their stand on this issue recently. 
They took a decision to be more flexible in evidentiary issues by allowing applicants to present credible witnesses. Apparently, the 
commissions are also working on formulating a solution to re-evaluate the rejected applications. Phone interview with a lawyer 
in Hakkâri, 31 January 2006.
212 Interview with Sezgin Tanrıkulu, President of Diyarbakır Bar Association, 14 March 2006.
213 See text accompanying footnote 215. 
214 Decision dated 07.03.2005/4433 and numbered 2005/16 in the application of Hamdi Alçiçek on 25.08.2004. Damage Assessment 
Commission No: 1, Hakkâri Governorship. 
215 Report of the Hakkâri Province Jandarma Command dated 17.12.2004. 
216 Van Administrative Court decision dated 30.09.1999 and numbered 1999/913. 
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the commission produced an unlawful decision which has since been taken to the court for review.217 The 
outcome of this and other similar rejection decisions by commissions will be the real test of how effective 
and adequate the legal mechanism established by the Compensation Law is. 
The government should set up an administrative body to re-examine upon appeal the rulings of the 
commissions, including those of inadmissibility. Provided that its evaluation of petition files is limited to a 
reasonable timeframe, such a body would exert a positive pressure on resistant commissions and guarantee 
their supervision without obstructing the implementation of the law. Furthermore, while the Compensation 
Law provides judicial review of the decisions made by the commissions, the financial cost of filing a lawsuit218 
and the length of the judicial process219 could discourage applicants from seeking review in courts. Indeed, 
official figures indicate that so far the vast majority of IDPs have agreed to settle with the commissions in 
the cases concluded so far.220 In this respect, the exemption of IDPs from legal fees in cases they will bring in 
administrative courts and the provision of legal aid to the indigent could force the commissions to give the 
applications due consideration and care. This is particularly vital since seeking judicial review at the cost of 
time and money is not a realistic option for most IDPs who are in dire financial need.
6.2.9  Damage Assessment Commissions: Composition, Resources and Working  
 Conditions
The commissions’ composition predominantly of public officials undermines their impartiality and 
independence. It also results in arbitrariness and inconsistencies in implementation, by making the 
commissions’ performance contingent on the attitudes of public officials. As a result of the goodwill of the 
public officials in Batman and Diyarbakır, commissions in these provinces operate in a swift, coordinated 
and fair manner within the constraints of the law.221 By contrast, the commissions in Mardin and Şırnak are 
reported to rule most of the petitions inadmissible and work very slowly.222 The equitable and fair handling 
of applications is only feasible with the help of competent and independent experts able to evaluate losses 
caused by internal displacement. The inclusion in the commissions of local administrations, human rights 
lawyers and NGOs working on internal displacement would not only help achieve that purpose, but would 
also assure the legitimacy of the commissions in the eyes of the IDPs. 
For the commissions to work effectively, they also need to be provided with the requisite working 
conditions and resources. That the commission members provide this public service in addition to their 
main duties without receiving a meaningful compensation not only slows down the process, but also makes 
the commissions’ performance contingent on the goodwill of their members.223 Attorneys serving at the 
commissions suffer an additional grievance, because, unlike the rest of the members, they do not have a 
regular income. The absence of funds allocated to the commissions, and the lack of personnel and technical 
equipment also slow down their performance. Even in Batman – which has a good implementation record 
– only 410 out of a total of 7,843 petitions had been finalised as of 25 October 2005.224 In other words, 
more than a year after the establishment of the first commission in Batman, not even 10 per cent of the 
total petitions had been finalised. The situation in Diyarbakır gives even greater reason for concern. As of 
15 February 2006, only 1,690 out of a total of 31,830 petitions, in other words a little over five per cent, 
had been evaluated.225 When one considers that in some provinces most of the petitions that have been 
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217 Pending before the Van Administrative Court.
218 On a positive note, the Compensation Law exempts IDPs from legal fees in the applications they file with the damage assessment 
commissions. 
219 Lawyers point out that the conclusion of a case at the administrative courts takes between 4-6 years under the current workload 
of the two regional administrative courts in the southeast. They point out that this period could further increase with the addition 
to the case load of these courts new applications filed under the process initiated by the Compensation Law. 
220 According to national figures, as of the end of 2005, 4,003 applicants had signed declarations of friendly settlement as against 261 
that refused to do so. MOI document, see footnote 172.
221 However, there are reports that the commissions in these provinces have slowed down after the ECtHR’s İçyer judgment. See the 
discussion above under “Problems in Implementation”. Recently, the number of commissions in Diyarbakır has been reduced from 
four to three, notwithstanding that the vast majority of the applications have not yet been processed. Written communication 
with Murat Güzel and Tahir Elçi, Diyarbakır Bar Association, 15 March 2006.
222 Phone interview with a lawyer in Diyarbakır. October 2005. Indeed, according to official figures, 732 out of 847 and 1,224 out of 
1,415 processed applications have been rejected in Mardin and Şırnak, respectively. MOI Document, see footnote 172. Furthermore, 
commissions in Şırnak have not yet started to evaluate the applications regarding village evictions nor undertaken fact-finding 
missions. Written communication with Murat Güzel and Tahir Elçi, Diyarbakır Bar Association, 15 March 2006.  
223 While the recent amendment to the Compensation Law requires the payment to each commission member of nearly 22 NTL per 
session, not to exceed six sessions a month, this minimal amount fails to correspond to the long working hours the members put 
into their work. Furthermore, the prospective application of the amendment suggests that the work that the commission members 
have done for more than a year since the enactment of the Compensation Law will not be compensated. For the amendment to 
the Compensation Law, see Law no. 5442, see footnote 159. 
224 Written communication provided by the Batman Governorship, 25 October 2005.
225 Information provided by the Diyarbakır Governorship, 19 February 2006.
evaluated so far are “easy” cases that do not require damage assessment226 and that the commissions 
seem to have slowed down after Içyer, it is clearly impossible for commissions to process the pending 
petitions within the mandatory two-year period.227 The government’s decision to extend the deadline for 
applications until 3 January 2007 is a very welcome development.228 In order to ensure an equitable process, 
it should also extend the two-year limit for the evaluation of the applications.
Outstanding issues/further recommendations:
The shortcomings in the Compensation Law and the problems in its implementation undermine its 
significance. The temporal and substantive scope of the law should be extended so as to cover all IDPs 
who were forcibly evicted or were obliged to flee due to the armed conflict. The law should be amended 
to cover non-pecuniary damages in accordance with the ECtHR case law, in order to compensate the pain 
and suffering of IDPs whose rights to life, liberty and security, as well as property have been violated. 
The government should initiate a public information campaign on the law in Turkish and Kurdish, in 
collaboration with NGOs and local administrations. The Turkish Bar Association and local bar associations 
should advise their members to abide by codes of professional conduct and monitor their implementation 
of the Compensation Law. The bar administrations could seek assistance from international institutions in 
drafting a set of guidelines to lawyers as well as an information pamphlet to IDPs on their rights and options 
under the Compensation Law. The commissions should be allowed to determine all types of damages on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account the subjective circumstances of each case. The two-year period for 
evaluating petitions should be extended to a more realistic timeframe. To ensure unity in implementation, 
the government should develop a clear position on the law; send the commissions binding implementing 
guidelines and instruct them not to abide by strict formal evidentiary rules in processing claims; and 
cooperate with civil society to provide training not just to the governors and their deputies, but to all 
members of the commissions. As a first step, the government should publicly express its political support to 
the effective and just implementation of the law. The Commissions should not attribute evidentiary weight 
to the information provided by the jandarma. An administrative appeal body should be set up to evaluate 
the decisions of the commissions within a time limit of two-three months. To ensure their access to courts, 
IDPs should be exempted from legal fees in administrative courts and be provided with legal aid upon need. 
The structure of the commissions should be changed in favour of a balanced representation of civil society 
and the public sector. The commissions should be professionalised, their numbers should be increased and 
their working conditions should be improved. 
7. COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
7.1 Relevant Recommendations from the Representative
To the government of Turkey:
Cooperation with international agencies:  in its efforts to meet the current needs of the displaced 
and to facilitate their return and resettlement, it is strongly recommended that the government 
examine areas of possible cooperation with the international community.  So far, the international 
community has not contributed to the government’s return efforts, and the government has not 
requested any such international assistance. However, the task ahead of the government is a 
formidable one for which assistance from international agencies would be a significant asset. The 
government might consider convening a meeting with international agencies, including the World 
Bank, and representatives of the potential partners to explore ways in which the international 
community could assist the government in responding to the needs of the displaced.
226 This is the case, for example, in Şırnak. Written communication with Murat Güzel and Tahir Elçi, Diyarbakır Bar Association, 15 
March 2006. This was also the case in Batman and Diyarbakır until around Summer 2005. Ibid, and fieldwork in Batman, June 
2005. 
227 Provisional Article 1. 
228 Law no. 5442, see footnote 159. 
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To the United Nations:
Enhanced role for UN agencies:  in connection with the foregoing, it is recommended that UN 
agencies in the country review their activities with a view to identifying ways in which they might 
enhance their role in supporting the government in its efforts to assist the displaced.  The RSG 
also recommends that the UN Development Assistance Group expressly request the Resident 
Coordinator to develop, in cooperation with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), a strategy 
to assist the government, in particular with regard to its efforts to return and resettle the displaced. 
In addition, and with a view to facilitating cooperation between the government and UN agencies, 
the Resident Coordinator and UNCT are encouraged to consider the establishment of a thematic 
group on internally displaced persons to bring together the relevant UN and government actors 
and provide a forum for regular dialogue on this issue.
7.2 Cooperation with the United Nations
The clearest result of the RSG’s visit to Turkey has been the Turkish government’s willingness to cooperate 
with the international community, especially with the UN. The government has been closely working with 
the UNDP, although progress is somewhat slow. UNDP has provided technical advice on the development 
of the Hacettepe Survey and support for capacity building; and the agency plans to continue to assist the 
government on the development of policies targeting IDPs.
In line with the recommendations in the RSG’s report, the government took the initiative to organise a series 
of meetings at the foreign ministry with the participation of international organisations in December 2003 
and January 2004. Representatives from the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNDP, the World Bank and the European Commission (EC) 
as well as officials from relevant government departments participated in these meetings. The clearest 
outcome of this cooperation was the initiation of the Hacettepe Survey, which is expected to be the basis 
for the formulation and implementation of further national and international IDP programmes. Another 
outcome was the translation of the Guiding Principles and their Annotations into Turkish and the training 
of sub-provincial governors and officials from the interior ministry in the use of the Guiding Principles. A 
further outcome of this cooperation is the Framework Document, which names the interior ministry as the 
coordinating body on IDP-related issues. 
Recently, the foreign ministry signed an international agreement with the UNDP. It is awaiting approval by 
the Council of Ministers to become official. According to the agreement titled Support to the Development 
of an IDP Programme in Turkey, the UNDP will assist the government of Turkey in developing a well-
defined IDP return programme by (i) supporting the development and implementation of an IDP survey 
according to international standards through consultation and advice; (ii) piloting a project to facilitate 
the government’s efforts to support the return and/or integration in one of the provinces in south-east or 
east Turkey; (iii) enabling UNDP to respond to the technical and other expertise needs of the government 
and the UNCT229 on the basis of demand; and (iv) disseminating the Guiding Principles and supporting 
activities to raise awareness about them, and supporting capacity building. As explained above in this 
report (see “Data Collection”), the government was in consultation with the UNDP with regard to the 
Hacettepe Survey. 
During RSG Walter Kälin’s visit to Turkey between 4 and 6 May 2005, the NRC Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, in cooperation with the UNDP, provided a training workshop on the Guiding Principles 
to the vice-governors of the 14 provinces affected by internal displacement. UNDP and the NRC Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre are planning to organise capacity-building and awareness workshops on 
the use of the Guiding Principles for local civil society organisations in the months to come. 
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229 The UNCT is formed of chief representatives of all the UN institutions operating in Turkey.
UN representatives note that the interior ministry has been cooperative and receptive to their advice. 
However, this cooperation cannot be considered “systematic” until the agreement is approved by the 
Council of Ministers. UN consultation with the government on the IDP issue will continue to be considered 
ad hoc until this agreement becomes “official”. 
The RSG’s report also recommends convening a meeting with international agencies, including the World 
Bank, whose representatives were present in meetings at the initial stages of the cooperation between 
the government and international agencies. A foreign ministry official said that the government would 
be open and willing to cooperate with the World Bank in various projects related to IDPs if the Bank 
approaches them.230
7.3 Cooperation with the European Commission
Since Turkey became a candidate for EU accession at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the EU has 
played an important role in Turkey’s evolving approach on the IDP issue.231 It should be noted that all 
significant developments, including the RSG’s mission and the international cooperation that ensued, have 
been realised in the wake of the Helsinki Summit. From that point, the European Commission’s annual 
progress reports, which note Turkey’s progress as well as the areas for further improvement in fulfilling the 
Copenhagen Criteria,232 have mentioned the conditions of the displaced. The EC reports have addressed 
rights, return and compensation-related issues pertaining to internal displacement. For instance, in the 
2004 Progress Report which came just before the EU declared in December that accession negotiations with 
Turkey would begin, the Commission noted that the situation in the eastern and south-eastern region of the 
country had continued to improve since 1999, both in terms of security and the enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms, that the emergency rule has been lifted and that IDP return continued. But it also said that the 
situation of IDPs remained critical.233 
The European Commission has been a chief international actor calling on the government to take action 
on the issue of internal displacement through its political dialogue with the government. But the Turkish 
government’s response in addressing these issues in terms of clarifying and developing policies has been 
relatively slow (see “Clarifying and Disseminating the National Policy” above).  
7.4 Enhanced Role for United Nations Agencies
As recommended by the RSG, the the UN Country Team formed a thematic group on IDPs in 2003, with 
representatives from UNHCR, UNDP, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), IOM, as well as occasional participation 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The objective of the IDP Working Group is to provide 
guidance to national agencies on advocacy and policy issues related to internal displacement. The 
group is led by Jakob Simonsen, the UN Resident Coordinator, and it takes the Guiding Principles and its 
annotations as the basis of its work.
The thematic group determined its annual work plan and a strategy to provide guidance to national 
agencies. According to UN officers, the Turkish government fully cooperated with the UN thematic group 
during this process (see also “Clarifying and Disseminating the National Policy” above).234 As mentioned 
above, the UNDP plans to provide capacity-building training for NGOs for the use of the Guiding Principles. 
However, UN assistance to civil society should not be limited to such awareness-raising activities. NGOs may 
assume constructive roles in fostering trust between national authorities and IDPs in the process of return 
and in helping with the reintegration of urban IDPs. The UNDP should help build bridges between the 
government and civil society for cooperation in these areas. 
230 Interview with a foreign ministry official, 13 February 2006.
231 For further discussion of how the European Union affected Turkey’s policies related to the issue, see Ayşe Betül Çelik, 
“Transnationalisation of Human Rights and Its Impact on Internally Displaced Kurds”, Human Rights Quarterly, 27:3 (2005): 969-
996.
232 European Council in Copenhagen (21–22 Jun. 1993), Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93 Rev 1, available at http://ue.euint/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf. 
233 EC, 2004 “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession”, 6 October 2004, available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/turkey/docs.htm.
234 Interview with a UNDP officer, 14 February 2006.
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Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
Since RSG Deng’s visit in 2002, an active cooperation has developed between the government and the UN 
on the IDP issue, culminating in the signing of an agreement in 2005 for a UNDP project titled Support to 
the Development of an IDP Programme in Turkey. But while the UN has been giving consultation to the 
government, there is also a need for more systematic and transparent cooperation between the UN and 
NGOs on the IDP issue. The UN, in cooperation with the government, should encourage NGOs to participate 
in the design and implementation of policies targeting IDPs on the issues of return and reintegration. 
The European Commission has been a significant external factor in encouraging Turkey to take steps for 
addressing its IDP problem since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey became a candidate for EU 
accession. It should also be more proactive in providing consultation and guidance to the government on 
its evolving IDP policy. The government may incorporate the EU into the policy implementation process 
through socioeconomic and other projects related to IDPs’ return and reintegration. In addition to the EU 
progress reports published annually, the European Commission should provide information and disseminate 
its opinion on the IDP issue more frequently.
8. RECONCILIATION
The issue of “reconciliation” was not addressed by the RSG in his recommendations to the Turkish 
government. The government’s Framework Document does not address the issue of past human rights 
violations committed against IDPs – such as the burning and destruction of property, killings, disappearances 
and torture – committed by security forces, village guards and PKK members in the process of displacement. 
However, the TESEV Working Group’s fieldwork shows that there is a genuine and urgent need for the 
government to take steps towards answering the need for reconciliation between the parties to the 
conflict. 
It should be noted that the Compensation Law’s Preamble makes an allusion to the need for reconciliation. 
The Preamble states among the law’s aims, “bolstering trust towards the state, rapprochement between 
the state and its citizens and contributing to social peace”.235 The Compensation Law, however, is limited 
to providing reparation for material damages, and precludes compensation for pain and suffering (see 
“Compensation Law” above). However, reconciliation and durable peace require confronting past human 
rights abuses and establishing restorative justice. 
The Compensation Law has raised expectations among IDPs, civil society organisations and lawyers that it 
would open the way for the public admission of forced evictions by security forces as well as other human 
rights violations, and lead to either bringing the perpetrators before courts or at least paying reparation for 
pain and suffering.236 The law does not require proof of fault on the part of the administration, but rests 
on the “doctrine of social risk based on the objective responsibility of the state”.237 However, in order for 
justice to be achieved it is essential that those responsible for violations are identified and brought before 
the court. The TESEV Working Group observed in Batman and Hakkâri that particularly some families 
whose relatives have disappeared or been killed by unidentified perpetrators believe that justice will not 
be achieved unless the perpetrators are prosecuted. 
Those who committed abuses, including security forces, village guards and the PKK during the original 
process of displacement have rarely been prosecuted.238 A recent development well-covered in the national 
media – the discovery of a mass grave near a village whose population was evicted in the Kulp district of 
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235 Compensation Law, Preamble.
236 For instance, the Planning and Budgeting Commission’s Report on the draft law of 13 July 2004 stated that “it is not equitable 
for only material damages to be compensated” alluding to the need for paying compensation for pain and suffering as well. 
Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı Hakkında Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu, 
available from http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem22/yil01/ss650m.htm.
237 Compensation Law, Preamble.
238 Many IDPs the TESEV Working Group interviewed testified that village guards or the jandarma burned their homes; threatened, 
publicly humiliated or hassled them; and then forcefully evicted them from their homes. 
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Diyarbakır – triggered a wave of demands for bringing to justice the killers of 11 villagers. Local human 
rights organisations, Human Rights Association‘s Diyarbakir branch, the Diyarbakır Bar Association and two 
members of parliament called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice, echoing a call made time and 
again by the ECtHR in many cases involving human rights violations committed by security forces during 
the process of internal displacement.239 Both organisations are demanding judicial and parliamentary 
investigations of the incident.240 If a judicial process gets initiated on this matter as a result of pressure from 
civil society, it would set an important precedent. The emerging public debate about this case and several 
others on violations committed during the emergency rule suggests that the time may be ripe for initiating 
a candid discussion about setting up a mechanism of reconciliation to address issues of impunity.
Outstanding issues/further recommendations: 
IDPs, NGOs and the government express the need for rebuilding “trust towards the state” and “social 
peace”, goals identified in the Compensation Law. Establishing social rehabilitation in the wake of a 
traumatic period of conflict and ensuing displacement cannot be limited to issues concerning the payment 
of reparation, return and reintegration, but should also include reconciliation. Although achieving 
reconciliation may take a long time, the government should take steps to initiate the process. The state’s 
public acknowledgement of responsibility for village evictions, compensation for pain and suffering, and 
declaration of a will to identify and prosecute – where possible – those who committed human rights 
violations during displacement and return may be among such measures. However, it is also important 
to bear in mind that reconciliation would require the PKK to demonstrate a similar will to assume its 
responsibility for the human rights violations it has committed. A dialogue should be initiated between 
the civil society and the government about setting up a structure for reconciliation bearing in mind the 
examples of truth and reconciliation commissions elsewhere in the world. 
239 The ECtHR has stressed that “effective remedy” within the meaning of Article 13 of the ECHR requires, in addition to the payment of 
compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment 
of the perpetrators of human rights violations. See e.g. ECtHR, Case of Hasan Ilhan v. Turkey (2005) Application No: 22494/93, 9 
November; ECtHR, Case of Menteşe and Others v. Turkey (2005) Application No: 36217/97, 18 January; ECtHR, Case of Ipek v. Turkey 
(2004) Application No: 25760/94, 17 February; ECtHR, Case of Orhan v. Turkey (2002) Application No: 25656/94, 18 June.  
240 Zihni Erdem and Ahmet Kıvanç, “Katliam Emrini Kim Verdi”, Radikal, 14 February 2006, available from http://www.radikal.com.
tr/haber.php?haberno=178653.

TESEV
The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), established in 1994, is an Istanbul-based 
independent think-tank, which forms a bridge between academic research and the policy-making process. 
TESEV has three programmes: Democratisation, Foreign Policy and Governance. The TESEV Democratisation 
Programme undertakes projects in fi ve main areas, which it deems to be the main obstacles to democratisation 
in Turkey: internal displacement and the Kurdish question; minority rights and constitutional citizenship; the 
democratic oversight of the security sector; religion-state-society relationship; and social perceptions and 
mentalities hampering democratisation.
The “Internal Displacement and Social Rehabilitation Project” was launched by the TESEV Democratisation 
Programme in 2004. Designed and implemented by an independent and inter-disciplinary Working and 
Monitoring Group composed of fi ve academics, the Project’s objective is promoting a democratic and just 
solution of Turkey’s internal displacement problem. Through this Project, TESEV Working and Monitoring 
Group carries out research, advocacy and monitoring activities targeting the government, the media, civil 
society and public opinion.  
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, 
is the leading international body monitoring confl ict-induced internal displacement worldwide. Through 
its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist 
the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of 
confl icts or human rights violations. 
At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based IDMC runs an online database providing comprehensive 
information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries. Based on its monitoring and data 
collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in 
line with international standards. The IDMC also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of 
local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people (IDPs). In its work, the Centre cooperates 
with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives. 
Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation
